University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2016

"The More Things Change . . .": New Moves for
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination in a "Post-Race"
World
Mario L. Barnes

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Barnes, Mario L., ""The More Things Change . . .": New Moves for Legitimizing Racial Discrimination in a "Post-Race" World" (2016).
Minnesota Law Review. 221.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/221

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Article

“The More Things Change . . .”: New Moves
for Legitimizing Racial Discrimination in
a “Post-Race” World
†

Mario L. Barnes

If race is something about which we dare not speak in polite social
company, the same cannot be said of the viewing of race. How, or
whether, blacks are seen depends upon a dynamic of display that ricochets between hypervisibility and oblivion. Blacks are seen ‘everywhere,’ taking over the world one minute; yet the great ongoing toll of
poverty and isolation that engulfs so many remains the object of persistent oversight.
1
-Patricia Williams, Seeing a Color-Blind Future: The Paradox of Race

INTRODUCTION
In his influential article, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Su2
preme Court Doctrine, Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholar
Alan David Freeman attempts to address the “persistent oversight” of which Patricia Williams speaks in the above quoted
language. He does so by reviewing twenty-five years of U.S.
† Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development, Co-Director, Center on Law, Equality and Race, University of California, Irvine, School of Law; B.A., J.D., UC Berkeley; L.L.M., University of Wisconsin. Significant thanks are owed to Sameer Ashar, Jonathan Glater, Osagie
Obasogie, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, and L. Song Richardson, for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Discussions with my fellow “Critical
Race Theory and the Supreme Court” panelists, Robert Chang, Nancy Leong
and Perry Moriarity, contributed to the direction taken in this piece. Finally,
my deep gratitude is extended to Tanya Taylor for her able research assistance, and members of the Minnesota Law Review, especially Rajin Olson, for
including me in the Standing on the Shoulders of Giants Symposium and their
excellent editing. Copyright © 2016 by Mario L. Barnes.
1. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLOR-BLIND FUTURE: THE PARADOX
OF RACE 17 (1997).
2. Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62
MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) [hereinafter Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination].
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Supreme Court jurisprudence in diverse areas, with the goal of
analyzing the space between the statutory and constitutional
prohibitions on racial discrimination and the continuing subordination of racial minorities. Starting in 1954, and dividing the
period into three eras where varied judicial approaches to race
and antidiscrimination prevailed, he astutely identified how inequality is maintained partially through the complicity of legal
3
actors. His analysis asserted that this regrettable circumstance occurred because the Court typically sought to address
violations of antidiscrimination principles rather than inculcate
remedies and focused principally on perpetrator conduct rather
4
than the conditions of victims. Moreover, the Court’s analyses
applied ambiguous or so-called “colorblind” interpretations of
5
the Equal Protection Clause, which presumed that “racial classifications almost always are unrelated to any valid govern6
mental purpose,” and frequently failed to give primacy to matters of substantive equality. Focusing on U.S. Supreme Court
cases primarily from the areas of education, voting, and employment, Freeman repeatedly demonstrated how judicial conduct across the eras he identified simultaneously instantiated
racial disadvantage for minorities while bolstering society’s
7
moral claims to providing fair treatment to all.
In the nearly forty years since Professor Freeman published his article, despite the improvements in many areas of
race relations—to include the election of the country’s first African-American president—the disjuncture Freeman located
remains, and, in some ways, has worsened. Gaps for people of
color between law’s protective promise and their lived experi-

3. See id. at 1057–118.
4. Id. at 1118–19.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”) In the dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson—the case
famous for adopting as lawful in the majority a position that came to be known
as “separate but equal”—colorblind interpretations were given life when Justice Harlan averred, “[o]ur constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens.” 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
6. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1066.
7. According to Professor Freeman, the falsity of the liberal promise of
equality is maintained by the Court manipulating antidiscrimination law to
convince society of the doctrine’s legitimacy by “hold[ing] out a promise of liberation” that it “refrain[s] from delivering on.” Id. at 1052.
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8

ence, however, are now regarded by many as not arising out of
racial bias at all. While Professor Freeman wrote his piece during a time where courts articulated then embraced colorblind
9
constitutionalism, he appears to have foreseen that the country was moving rapidly beyond claims of “not seeing” race toward more completely denying the salience of race. In particular, he suggested that beginning in 1974—which was at the end
of the time period he initially analyzed—the country entered
10
into an “Era of Rationalization.” In this era, antidiscrimination law was marked by a pretense that the aspirational future
where racial discrimination would be an “occasional aberra11
tional practice” was “already here and functioning.” These
comments signaled that well before the idea of completely mov8. This attentiveness to the space between law “in books” and law “in
action,” or the way that legal rules are often subjectively manipulated by judges and other legal actors, is a central claim of the legal realists. See Brian
Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76
TEX. L. REV. 267, 267–68 (1997) (discussing the premise that laws are shaped
not by rules, per se, but by the political and moral leanings of judges); Roscoe
Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910) (explaining
that the justification of law as a device to secure liberty is to preserve individual liberty). In a contemporary vein, we have seen scholars attempt to revitalize and expand the tenets of legal realism. See Howard Erlanger et al., Is It
Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335 (substantially reframing legal realism around the need for the empirical study of law). Variously
described as a “‘new legal realism’ or as ‘empirical legal studies,’ this restored
focus on the social sciences in many ways echoes an earlier era of legal realism
in American law, with some important differences.” Elizabeth Mertz, Inside
the Law School Classroom: Toward a New Legal Realist Pedagogy, 60 VAND.
L. REV. 483, 483 (2007) (citation omitted).
9. See Ian F. Haney López, Is the “Post” in Post-Racial the “Blind” in
Colorblind?, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 809 (2010) (identifying colorblindness as
a twentieth century aspirational view of race as operating neither to confer
privilege nor disadvantage). Similar to Alan Freeman, Neil Gotanda asserts
that “color-blind constitutionalism—a collection of legal themes functioning as
a racial ideology—fosters white racial domination.” Neil Gotanda, A Critique
of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1991).
10. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1102.
While not discussed extensively in this Article, Professor Freeman identified
two additional eras in this piece. From 1954 to 1965, he described an “Era of
Uncertainty” where it was initially unclear how the Court would deal with a
perpetrator-focused antidiscrimination jurisprudence in a post-Brown world.
Id. at 1057. From 1965 to 1974, there was the “Era of Contradiction,” where
the Court struggled to balance between fixating on violations versus remedies
in antidiscrimination cases. Id. at 1079. Part of the contradiction within this
era was produced by that fact that once the Court acknowledged race as relevant to understanding violations in particular traditional contexts, it would be
forced to consider race in other contexts, given the pervasiveness of racial discrimination. Id. at 1080–81.
11. Id. at 1103.
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ing beyond identity occupied our societal imagination, the
Court had moved to a perspective that is now best described as
being post-race. Professor Freeman confirmed this understanding that the Court essentially no longer considered race to be a
meaningful category for determining social status several years
later. Just over a decade after writing Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, Professor Freeman updated his assessment of antidiscrimination law in a Tulane Law Review article entitled,
12
Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989. For anyone who
doubts Legitimizing Racial Discrimination had identified a
post-race leaning in the Court, The View from 1989 confirmed
the blossoming of the phenomenon he earlier outlined in his
13
“Era of Rationalization.” In The View from 1989, Professor
Freeman closes out that previously open-ended era in 1984,
and describes subsequent cases from that point on as belonging
14
to an “Era of Denial.” In that era, Professor Freeman claims
the Court “complete[d] the dismantling process that had begun
in the period of rationalization” by treating unequal conditions
of victim groups as a “neutral feature of our socioeconomic
15
landscape.”
In The View from 1989, using primarily employment cases
occurring between 1974 and 1989, Professor Freeman effectively predicted an approach to antidiscrimination that substantially remains to this day. While the “Era of Denial” was left
16
open-ended, there are some very important differences between approaches to antidiscrimination law in the late 1980s
and today. For one, Professor Freeman spoke of a supposed victory over racial bias that could be inferred from the outcomes of
cases. Today, the Court’s post-race perspective, or perhaps,
mantra, need not be inferred. It has explicitly and repeatedly
made such representations, which have grown in ardor, at least
17
since the rise of President Barack Obama. Moreover, as key
recent opinions of the Roberts Court demonstrate, postracialism now functions more as a primary lens, rather than as
12. Alan David Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989,
64 TUL. L. REV. 1407 (1990) [hereinafter Freeman, The View from 1989].
13. Id. at 1422–26.
14. Id. at 1426.
15. Id. at 1426–27.
16. Id. at 1426–41.
17. See Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589 (2009); Ian F.
Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023 (2010) [hereinafter Haney
López, Post-Racial Racism].
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a background theory used to bolster the merits of ostensibly
18
neutral decision-making. Relevant to Professor Freeman’s
claims, in a world where race has presumptively lost its salience, the Court is even more empowered to focus on perpetrators over victims, violations rather than remedies, and formal
instead of substantive equality. Additionally, in a society where
race is of no consequence, little analysis need be invested in assessing the institutional and structural, rather than individual,
means at work in creating disadvantage. Applying Professor
Freeman’s method of assessing key antidiscrimination cases in
voting, education, and employment within a modern context,
this Article identifies the contemporary manner in which postrace discourses are used to legitimize discrimination. The goal
is not to assess every race case in these areas over the last
twenty-five years, but rather to analyze particularly representative matters. Much in the way that Professor Freeman
foregrounded CLS and legal realism principles in his analysis,
this Article will similarly apply foundational concepts and
scholarship from a prominent CLS successor movement that
19
has arisen since 1978—Critical Race Theory (CRT). In order
to stay focused on Professor Freeman’s primary arguments,
this Article also accepts some constraints on analysis imposed
within his critique. Like Professor Freeman, the analysis here
will be limited to looking at racial discrimination rather than
18. See infra notes 129–33 and accompanying text.
19. Critical Race Theory is a scholarly movement and philosophy that is
committed to “studying and transforming the relationship among race, racism,
and power.” RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
AN INTRODUCTION 2 (2001). CRT grew out of and has always been closely
aligned with the Critical Legal Studies movement, with both being described
as “reject[ing] the prevailing orthodoxy that scholarship should be or could be
‘neutral’ and ‘objective.’” CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT, at xiii (Kimberlé W. Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
Specifically, CRT was formed by a group of scholars of color (race-“crits”) who
were concerned with how CLS treated issues of race at its conference and
within its scholarship. Id. at xiv–xix. In addition to the Crenshaw text, foundational readings from the CRT movement have been amassed in several other edited collections. See CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien K. Wing
ed., 2003) (including articles about racism and civil rights intertwined with
feminism, gender, mental illness, and social class); CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) (including articles about the
intersection of race, sex, and class as well as critical race feminism and essentialism/antiessentialism); CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL
RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002); THE DERRICK BELL READER
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic et al. eds., 2005) (including many articles
about racial realism, racial standing, price of racial remedies, and racism as
meanness).
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myriad forms of bias, and will focus primarily on black-white
20
relations.
Based on the foregoing, this Article will focus primarily on
three aspects of Professor Freeman’s scholarship. Part I focuses
on the eerily prescient aspect of Freeman’s work: how courts
transformed legal doctrine designed to fight discrimination into
a means to instantiate unfair societal race relations, by treating race as if it had lost its salience. With regard to these
claims, this Article situates Freeman’s work as an early commentary on the hazards of presuming America a post-race society. Second, Part II revisits Professor Freeman’s articulation of
the alternative understandings of equal protection under the
U.S. Constitution. Additionally, particular attention is paid to a
fissure: how Professor Freeman’s antidiscrimination critique
was important to enhancing the CLS critique of rights, but
simultaneously somewhat under-inclusive for meeting the
broader needs of the emerging CRT movement. Part III, guided
by CRT principles, argues that the Court has transitioned be21
yond the “Era of Denial” described by Professor Freeman.
Moving forward from 1989, and using Professor Freeman’s
method of assessing key Supreme Court decisions in the areas
of employment, education, and voting, this Article explores judicial antidiscrimination analysis in our now explicitly postrace world as implicating an “Era of Incredulity.” In essence,
the Court has moved beyond merely denying the influence of
race to professing astonishment at how anyone could imagine
race being the reason for the existence of unequal arrangements and life consequences across social groups. This is so
even in the face of significant data depicting racialized differ22
ences in most important areas of social life. As prominent
20. See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at
1050 n.8. On the dangers of antidiscrimination discourse overly focusing on a
black/white binary, see Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of
Race: The “Normal Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REV.
1213, 1219–21 (1997); cf. Roy L. Brooks & Kirsten Widner, In Defense of the
Black/White Binary: Reclaiming a Tradition of Civil Rights Scholarship, 12
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 107 (2010) (defending the black/white binary by arguing that critics have misread the extant law for civil rights and disrespect a tradition of black scholarship).
21. Freeman, The View from 1989, supra note 12, at 1426.
22. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A PostRace Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 982–92 (2010) (explicating disadvantages for Blacks in several important areas of social life); Richard Lempert,
A Personal Odyssey Toward a Theme: Race and Equality in the United States
1948–2009, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV. 431, 441–51 (2010) (looking at the fragility of
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CRT and Feminist Legal Scholar Angela Harris has stated,
based on the State’s decreased investment in white supremacy
and a belief that “racist ideology is now taboo,” Supreme Court
Justices are “now shocked, shocked! to find racial discrimina23
tion still occurring.” As a part of identifying the characteristics of this era, this Part evaluates something that Professor
Freeman under-considered—the Court’s obsessive tendency to
look for discrimination as stemming from individual conduct
rather than institutional practice. Based on the prescient nature of the analysis of discrimination attached to Professor
Freeman’s eras of rationalization and denial, this Article concludes that the “Era of Incredulity” antidiscrimination decisions, however, still typically legitimize discrimination, and
that the methods for doing so hold much in common with the
practices Professor Freeman observed. This is the impressive
but regrettable legacy of his work.
I. LEGITIMIZING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AS A POSTRACE PREQUEL
A primary contention of this Article is that Professor
Freeman’s theory of the judicially constructed, counterproductive effects of antidiscrimination law on racial equality is
nearly as relevant now as when he wrote Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination and its follow-up, The View from 1989. That is
so because nearly forty years ago, Professor Freeman already
foresaw that the Court’s interpretations were premised upon
24
contesting the continuing significance of race. A key reason
Professor Freeman’s articles remain germane is that at this
point in U.S. history, a significant portion of America has em25
braced the desire to transcend race. Marking the parameters
black progress over the years in the areas of income, wealth, education, employment and criminal justice); Reginald T. Shuford, Why Affirmative Action
Remains Essential in the Age of Obama, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 503, 512–21
(2009) (discussing disproportionately negative outcomes for Blacks in the areas of wealth accumulation, housing, and health outcomes).
23. Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Unbearable Lightness of Identity, 2
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 207, 208 (1995).
24. The Court invested in this narrative despite the emerging sociological
literature suggesting that even the positions of successful Blacks were precarious. See, e.g., Joe R. Feagin, The Continuing Significance of Race: Antiblack
Discrimination in Public Places, 56 AM. SOC. REV. 101 (1991) (looking at public accommodations and public-space discrimination and detailing the remaining hurdles for middle-class Blacks).
25. See Haney López, Post-Racial Racism, supra note 17, at 1024 (explaining how the election of Obama has inspired many to believe race as a basis for
social ordering in the United States has ended).
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of this so-called post-race desire has been undertaken by a
26
27
number of scholars from law and other disciplines. As one
communications scholar has suggested, in proclaiming society
post-race, there are multiple goals:
On the one hand, the existence of a post-race era proves that the Civil
Rights era accomplished its goals. Therefore, a post-race era is one in
which racism has no significance. On the other hand, living in a post28
race era means living in an era in which race itself is not significant.

Professor Freeman forecasted the emergence of both of these elements of post-race reasoning in his analysis of the “Era of
26. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, Reflection on a Dream World: Race, PostRace and the Question of Making It Over, 11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y
6, 7 (2009) (discussing how some used the rise of President Barack Obama to
claim that “America has, in fact, substantially overcome the longstanding effects of racism, and perhaps, its national obsession with race”); Cho, supra
note 17, at 1594 (defining post-racialism as “a twenty-first-century ideology
that reflects a belief that due to the significant racial progress that has been
made, the state need not engage in race-based decision-making or adopt racebased remedies”); Frank Rudy Cooper, Post-Racialism and Searches Incident
to Arrest, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 114 (2012) (“Post-racialism is the notion that
the United States has reached a point where race is so infrequently salient
that it no longer makes sense to organize around it or even acknowledge its
presence.”); Janine Young Kim, Postracialism: Race After Exclusion, 17 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 1063 (2013) (exploring myriad potential meanings of postracialism); cf. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism, supra note 17, at 1027 (arguing that the national obsession with denying the salience of race has produced
“‘post-racial racism,’ a term used to refer to the various practices that collectively operate to maintain racial hierarchy even in the face of a broad social
repudiation of purposeful racial mistreatment”).
27. THE EDUCATION OF BLACK MALES IN A POST-RACIAL WORLD (Anthony
Brown & Jamel Donnor eds., 2012) (discussing how the rise of President
Obama gave credence to a post-racial narrative that has affected the schooling
of black boys); CATHERINE R. SQUIRES, THE POST-RACIAL MYSTIQUE: MEDIA &
RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014) (exploring how various media
outlets define, employ, and interrogate the meaning of post-racialism in American society); Lawrence D. Bobo, Somewhere Between Jim Crow and PostRacialism: Reflections on the Racial Divide in America Today, 140 DAEDALUS
11, 13 (2011) (offering that there are multiple understandings of postracialism, including a term “intended merely to signal a hopeful trajectory for
events and social trends” and “the waning salience of what some have portrayed as a ‘black victimology’ narrative”); Marcia A. Dawkins, Mixed Messages: Barack Obama and Post-Racial Politics, 30 POST IDENTITY 9 (2010)
(analyzing media, President Obama, and post-racial politics); Gloria LadsonBillings & William F. Tate IV, Toward a Critical Race Theory of Education, 97
TCHRS. C. REC. 47, 47 (1995) (arguing for a critical race theoretical perspective
by “developing three propositions: (1) race continues to be significant in the
United States; (2) U.S. society is based on property rights rather than human
rights; and (3) the intersection of race and property creates and analytical tool
for understanding inequity”).
28. Dawkins, supra note 27, at 9–10 (citing Ralina L. Joseph, New Millennium “Mulattas”: Post-Ethnicity, Post-Feminism, and Mixed-Race (2005)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of San Diego)).
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29

Rationalization.” A key move in this era was to declare that
30
the “war is over,” and, discriminatory appearances aside, that
31
“the actual violation has already been cured.” In a sense, his
analysis was an early articulation of beliefs questioning racial
salience. Using the prevalent term of the period, he essentially
32
described the end result of operationalizing colorblindness.
While they share a common ideology, colorblindness and
post-racialism are not precisely the same thing. Colorblindness
speaks to an aspirational goal for people to work not to “see” (or
act upon) race; post-racialism more fervently declares the end
33
of race and racism as a mission accomplished. As Berkeley
Law Professor Ian Haney López has stated, “post-racialism
constitutes a liberal embrace of colorblindness. It differs in important particulars, but nevertheless largely tracks this ideology in a way likely to limit progress toward increased racial
34
equality.” Professor Freeman understood this tension between
aspiring toward racial equality and proclaiming racial parity
attained. He described antidiscrimination law as a prize in a
pitched battle between these competing interest groups—those
29. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1102. A
key feature of that era was the court seeking to limit the holding in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See Freeman, The View from 1989, supra
note 12, at 1423–24. Rather than solely focusing on the turn away from the
salience of race, Freeman focused his analysis on perspective, claiming that a
flaw of the U.S. system is that it is more concerned with perpetrators’ than
victims’ perspectives. Moreover, he notes that proof of discrimination is
achieved through identifying fault (intentionality) and causation. Id. at 1425–
26.
30. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1102.
The Court, however, has been attempting to declare racism dead nearly since
the slaves were freed. See Barnes, Chemerinsky & Jones, supra note 22, at
972–74.
31. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1102.
32. Importantly, when Professor Freeman wrote Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, the near fanatical requirement that government actions be “colorblind” had not been fully embraced by the Court. Id. at 1067 (“The color-blind
theory has never become the law; the Supreme Court has in fact explicitly upheld the remedial use of racial classifications on a number of occasions.” (citation omitted)). Since the late 1970s, however, many of the color-conscious remedies previously approved by the Court have been pared back. Id.
33. U.C. Hasting Law Professor Osagie Obasogie describes the phenomenon as follows: “[W]hile colorblindness offers a normative perspective on how
race ought to be treated in law and public policy, post-racialism operates as a
descriptive account of where society currently is.” OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE,
BLINDED BY SIGHT: SEEING RACE IN THE EYES OF THE BLIND 171 (2014).
34. Haney López, supra note 9, at 808; see also Barnes, Chemerinsky &
Jones, supra note 22, at 977–79 (discussing why the promise of post-racialism
is still premature).
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who saw the goals of color blindness as belonging to a better
but unrealized future and those who wished to use color blind35
ness to undermine remedial practices. Professor Freeman describes courts as advancing along this spectrum, away from
merely imagining a hopeful racial future toward pronouncing
improved racial conditions as the status quo. He does so in the
allegorical narrative that begins Legitimizing Racial Discrimination. In that narrative, Professor Freeman structures a conversation between “Black Americans” and “The Law,” where
“The Law” encourages Blacks to rejoice because “Racial dis36
crimination has now become illegal.” The true purpose of this
claim, “The Law” further instructs, is to deny Blacks meaningful equality and impress upon them that they should not “demand any remedy involving racial balance or proportionality; to
37
recognize such claims would be racist.”
A characteristic of modern, post-race politics is that in a
world where race is not deemed important for understanding
disparate conditions across social groups, it is the first person
38
that mentions race that is often deemed the racist. What Professor Freeman essentially described as an ill-considered judicial myopia of sorts, is a belief that has now been substantially
adopted as a favorable societal standard. Believers assert that
one need look no further than the Presidency of the United
States to observe proof that race no longer serves as a limiting
39
category. As will be argued in greater detail below, an en35.
36.
37.
38.

Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1107.
Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1050.
See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL
APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 133
(2014) (describing the practice where persons professing color blindness use
the label “racist” as a stinging counterattack against proponents of colorconsciousness injecting race into the conversation). This work is intellectually
tied to Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s game-changing work, which describes how the
United States ends up with disadvantage exhibiting a racial valence, even
though no one is racist. EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS:
COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN
AMERICA (4th ed. 2014).
39. See Bobo, supra note 27; Cho, supra note 17, at 1621–26 (contending
that black politicians should adopt post-racial electoral strategies to avoid
marginalization); Haney López, Post-Racial Racism, supra note 17, at 1023–26
(stating that many believe Obama’s election ended the basis for social ordering
around race in the United States); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L.
Barnes, The Obama Effect: Understanding Emerging Meanings of “Obama” in
Anti-Discrimination Law, 87 IND. L.J. 325, 325 (2012) (noting that, for many,
Obama’s election to “the most prominent, powerful, and prestigious job in the
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dorsement of America as truly post-race has freed up the Court
to move beyond the issues Professor Freeman noted, toward an
40
even stingier conception of equality. Twenty-five years ago,
literally structuring a conversation between “race” and “the
41
law,” he sought to expose this “dissonance in this dialogue.”
In his early description of the rise of post-racialism, Professor
Freeman had to infer such a belief from the Court opinions.
Since his 1989 article, however, courts—the U.S. Supreme
Court, in particular—have become increasingly explicit with
42
regard to their beliefs that race is now an outmoded concept.
As shall be discussed below in cases such as Grutter v. Bol43
44
linger, Parents Involved v. Seattle School District No. 1, Ricci
45
46
v. DeStefano, and Shelby County v. Holder, various opinions
of the Justices have been explicitly premised upon a belief that
race and racism no longer operate as significant impediments
47
within society. Understanding the nuanced slippage between
colorblindness and post-race helps one to understand how and
why the dissonance Professor Freeman identified has expanded. Prior, however, to assessing the impact of the Court’s now
fully post-race approach to equality, the next Part will first
consider broader implications of Professor Freeman’s antidiscrimination critique.

United States” symbolized the post-racial society, where race is no longer
meaningful).
40. A recent assessment of the Court’s analysis in race cases in the multiple areas considered within this Article—which were treated more favorably
during the Civil Rights Era—has made this point:
The Supreme Court has used individual rights to undermine much of
the practical work of the Second Reconstruction—from twisting employment discrimination law against itself in Ricci v. DeStefano to
slowly choking off the life of affirmative action in Fisher v. University
of Texas to gutting the Voting Rights Act in Shelby County v. Holder—all in the name of equal rights. Today’s Equal Protection Clause
works against equality more often than it furthers it.
Richard T. Ford, Rethinking Rights After the Second Reconstruction, 123 YALE
L.J. 2942, 2949–50 (2014) (citation omitted).
41. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1050.
42. Along with co-authors, I have argued in the past that the courts’ postrace leanings actually date back to Reconstruction. See Barnes, Chemerinsky
& Jones, supra note 22, at 969–75.
43. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
44. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
45. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
46. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
47. See infra notes 125–27, 129, 133–34, 136, 139, 183–84, 190, 219, 234–
35, 240–41, 270 and accompanying text.
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II. PROFESSOR FREEMAN’S ANTIDISCRIMINATION
ANALYSIS AND ITS INFLUENTIAL BEARING ON OTHER
CLS AND CRT CRITIQUES
While Professor Freeman’s critique was important for articulating an approach to race more fully adopted by courts
decades later, his critique had more immediate impacts. First,
it appears that Professor Freeman’s article provided a prominent, early CLS critique of the contours of Equal Protection
Doctrine, which became critically important to the broader CLS
48
critique of rights. Second, Professor Freeman’s critique was
formative to CRT, the burgeoning scholarly movement dedicated to identifying and rewriting the relationship between race,
law and power that followed CLS. This second effect is a bit
surprising given that one of the primary reasons race-crits constructed CRT as a separate enterprise was that CLS critiques
49
under-considered the importance of racism, and adopted an
50
overly nihilistic critique of rights. These two effects of his
piece are next considered.
A. ENHANCING THE CLS CRITIQUE OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION
To the extent CLS was an associated offshoot of American
Legal Realism, it was committed to demonstrating law’s indeterminacy; this commitment informed the CLS left critique of
51
legal reasoning. This critique was built upon the assertion
that “‘law’ is not distinct from ‘politics’ in any simple way” and
that legal doctrine was not only indeterminate, but contradictory and “systematically biased in favor of economically and so52
cially privileged elites.” Another prominent critique within
53
CLS, however, was the critique of rights. This criticism ap48. See infra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 92–94 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 95–105 and accompanying text.
51. See OBASOGIE, supra note 33, at 183–86 (noting that two primary tenets of CLS were its critique of legal formalism and the effects of law’s indeterminacy).
52. Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82
CALIF. L. REV. 741, 746 (1994).
53. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 166–71 (1990) (discussing the rights critique
of prominent CLS scholars Alan Freeman, Peter Gabel, Duncan Kennedy, and
Mark Tushnet); Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their
Critics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 641, 657–58 (David Kairys ed., 1998) (debating whether “rights” lack objective substance and if they are shared practices
that people adopt and use to subordinate groups); Morton Horwitz, Rights, 23
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393 (1988) (discussing the discourse of rights by defin-
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plied a deep skepticism to the progress that could be obtained
54
through rights discourse, and was partially framed through a
discussion of constitutional equal protection principles and
55
their accessibility to disadvantaged groups. In Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination, Professor Freeman sought to use his
views of antidiscrimination cases to stake out important ground
56
in the CLS rights critiques, in that his analysis moved beyond
abstractly theorizing the fallacy of rights to include a concrete
assessment of how judges were constructing and applying equal
protection principles in cases. This move ultimately provided a
57
rich and complimentary exemplar for the early CLS critique,
one that contributed to the framing of CLS and CRT rights discourses moving forward.
Even prior to Professor Freeman writing Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, legal scholars had problematized equal
ing the controversy and suggesting ways in which theories of rights have influenced the progress towards a more just society); Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23 (1993) (elaborating on the general critique
of rights by examining the relationship between legal victories and political
effects); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984) (explaining the four critiques of rights discussed in contemporary American legal
circles). Professor Freeman, however, claimed that there was no consensus on
a coherent CLS critique of rights. See Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the
Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 295, 316 (1988) [hereinafter Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest].
54. See, e.g., MATHIAS MÖSCHEL, LAW, LAWYERS AND RACE: CRITICAL
RACE THEORY FROM THE UNITED STATES TO EUROPE 53–54 (2014) (discussing
how rights discourse prevents real social transformation because it helps legitimize hegemony, which induces people to accept domination); OBASOGIE, supra note 33, at 185.
55. Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in
LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 178, 181–83 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley
eds., 2002) (describing the rhetorical emphasis on identity and antidiscrimination through the frame of “equal protection” for individual members
of previously subordinated social groups).
56. In essence, “the critique of formal antidiscrimination rights played a
major role in the development of the critical legal scholars’ critique of rights
. . . .” ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 147
(2011) (footnote omitted) (citing Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination,
supra note 2).
57. In his acknowledgments to Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, Professor Freeman thanked scholars associated with the Conference on Critical
Legal Studies. The founding meeting of the conference took place in Madison,
Wisconsin, in 1977. See Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, The First Decade: Critical Reflections, or “A Foot in the Closing Door,” 49 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1354 (2002)
[hereinafter Crenshaw, A Foot in the Closing Door]. The conference took place
a year before he published Legitimizing Racial Discrimination. In later work,
however, he directly associated himself and his work with the movement. See
Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest, supra note 53, at 296–97.
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protection as a somewhat inchoate concept, one capable of be58
ing endowed with multiple and oppositional meanings. Historically, one predominant analytical frame has focused on the
propriety of legal doctrine providing for similar treatment
across dissimilarly situated groups rather than seeking to en59
sure substantively similar outcomes. This disconnect has been
described, alternatively, in terms of approaches concerned with
60
classification versus subordination, formal versus substantive
61
equities, and a manifesting sameness/difference discourse in
62
equality jurisprudence. This difference between formal and
58. See, e.g., Reva B. Seigel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects:
The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111
(1997) (noting how equal protection doctrine has historically provided liminal
rights protections while failing to topple more troublesome status hierarchies).
59. On this point, the following words of Professor Angela Harris are instructive:
Above all, the language of equality seduces us away from the realities
of social power, and into an imaginary land where groups of people
can be laid side by side to see if they’re similarly situated, and then
they can be made equal. Equality discourse, then, inherently brings
us into a vexed relationship with history.
Angela P. Harris, Foreword: Beyond Equality: Power and the Possibility of
Freedom in the Republic of Choice, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1186 (2000).
60. A common oppositional reading of constitutional equality norms is referred to as a split between the anti-classification and anti-subordination approaches to the Equal Protection Doctrine. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B.
Seigel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003); Reva B. Seigel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race
Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 (2011) (adding antibalkinization—a commitment to race-conscious, facially neutral interventions which serve the ends
of social cohesion—to the anticlassification and antisubordination frameworks
for equal protection). Professor Freeman himself described equal protection as
being an unhelpful, morally neutral concept. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1058 (“In its pure form, the principle is perfectly abstract, concerned only with questions of neatness; inasmuch as it
serves to check technique rather than goal, it is utterly value-neutral.” (citation omitted)).
61. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal Opportunity: A Jurisprudential Appraisal, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1689–90 (1986).
62. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference
in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1923, 1962–66 (2000) (describing continuing racial dominance by interpreting racial distinctions in law
as a “notion of difference”); Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist
and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296. It is important to remember,
however, that there is no true biological significance of race; the concept was
created to mark perceived social/cultural differences for the purpose of excluding. See IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RACE (1996); Kim, supra note 26, at 1067–75, 1079–82 (examining race as difference, denigration, and exclusion).
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substantive equality was a starting point for Professor Freeman. While committed to the legal realist tradition, he was not,
however, content to merely note that formal equality was insufficient to protect the interests of historically disadvantaged
peoples. Rather, Professor Freeman created his own more detailed categories for assessing the Court’s antidiscrimination
jurisprudence. Beginning in 1954, with the Brown v. Board of
63
Education case and in what Professor Freeman describes at
the “Era of Uncertainty,” he uses cases to discuss multiple, po64
tential understandings of equality under the Constitution. He
labels the first two of these varying meanings as “means65
66
oriented,” and a “fundamental right” rationale.” By contrast,
the third meaning was tied to an understanding that historical67
ly the Clause was designed to provide rights to freed slaves.
According to Professor Freeman, through strategic but nonspecific maneuvering among these meanings, the Court defined
68
the resulting expanse of antidiscrimination laws. The Court’s
more consistently focusing upon the former two understandings, rather than questioning the historical purpose of the
Clause, is one factor that led to opinions Professor Freeman
saw as undermining racial equality. He also noted, however,
other common tendencies—operating across the varying meanings—that helped to explain why antidiscrimination laws rarely served the ends of racial justice.
Professor Freeman was especially critical of much of equality jurisprudence because opinions so heavily focused on judi63. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
64. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1057.
65. This approach regards the Equal Protection Clause as “nothing more
than a judicial check on legislative mistakes.” Id. at 1058.
66. This approach involves using the Fourteenth Amendment fundamental rights analysis to enforce the language of the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
at 1059–60. As opposed to suspect classification analysis under the clause,
Erwin Chemerinsky describes another overlap between the fundamental
rights (substantive due process) and equal protection analysis, which turns on
using the Equal Protection Clause to prevent discrimination in the exercise of
fundamental rights. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 691–92 (4th ed. 2011).
67. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1061.
Similarly, writing with Erwin Chemerinsky, I have previously asserted that
the purpose of the Reconstruction Amendments—to make freed slaves full citizens—should have been used to inform courts’ understandings of equality.
Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protection Doctrine, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059 (2010).
68. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1064–
65.
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cial perspectives concerned with perpetrators rather than vic69
tims. While this may seem like a somewhat facile insight, it
was very instructive for seeing judicial determinations as contextual. As Harvard Law Dean Martha Minow stated:
The critique of rights afforded by this argument introduces the possibility that reality is not unified but multiple and is based on the situation of the particular people perceiving it. Freeman suggests that
there is an important relationship between knowledge and power, between what is known and who does the knowing. This idea . . . also
opens up questions about how relationships between people influence
their knowledge about one another, and about how legal rules make
some perspectives seem simply true rather than selected over oth70
ers.

As a result of courts being overly invested in the perpetrator perspective, when a discrimination claim was advanced,
they would fixate on the conduct of individuals—seeking to locate intentional conduct that violated an “antidiscrimination
71
principle.” Moreover, a court captured by the perpetrator perspective focuses primarily on fault and causation rather than
72
73
remedy. Much like our modern post-race approach, the perpetrator perspective seeks to identify aberrant racist behavior
74
at odds with the innocent status that most citizens enjoy. Professor Freeman, however, endorsed the victim perspective,
where discrimination is defined through the conditions of the
75
social existence of members of subjugated groups.
B. PROFESSOR FREEMAN’S LEFT CRITIQUE OF RIGHTS AND THE
RISE OF THE CRT
While Professor Freeman’s work modeled the legal realist
tradition of marking the space between the law on the books
and on the ground, a second important contribution of his piece
is that it is a CLS critique of race and discrimination that was
part of an ongoing post-modernist leftist critique in the academy, which included burgeoning race-crit approaches. While Le69. Id. at 1052–57.
70. MINOW, supra note 53, at 167–68.
71. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1053.
The term is defined as a “prohibition of race-dependent decisions that disadvantage members of minority groups.” Id. at 1053–54.
72. Id. at 1054.
73. See Barnes, Chemerinsky & Jones, supra note 22, at 968–69, 975–76
(noting the effect of “post-racial” ideology on Supreme Court interpretation of
equality).
74. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1054–
55.
75. Id. at 1053.
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gitimizing Racial Discrimination was published ten years prior
to the formal creation of CRT, by the time Professor Freeman
76
wrote The View from 1989, there was certainly a burgeoning
critique of CLS and civil rights discourse by race-crits, a num77
ber of whom had ties to CLS. Until that time, prominent race
scholars such as Derrick Bell were publishing articles that engaged important race questions without necessarily critiquing
78
the CLS movement. CRT rose as a movement and body of legal scholarship during the same period Professor Freeman the79
orized the “Era of Denial.” By the content of his articles on
80
one could surmise that his theories of antirace,
discrimination should have provided a furtive starting place for
race-crits formulating their scholarly identity within the CLS
movement. The connection, however, between CLS and CRT
was more complicated. As Devon Carbado has articulated,
CLS created a condition of possibility for CRT not only in the sense of
rehearsing a set of themes about the indeterminacy of law and about
its productive capacity . . . to constitute social arrangements, social
hierarchies, and social interests but also in the sense of failing to se-

76. Freeman, The View from 1989, supra note 12.
77. See Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990)
(criticizing CLS for its penchant for theoretical criticism and deconstruction of
liberalism without sufficiently investigating why it holds such attraction to
the subordinated); Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal
Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1987)
[hereinafter Delgado, Ethereal Scholar] (explaining the problematic aspects of
CLS); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 562 n.3 (1984) (highlighting the insular minority rights scholarship of many, predominantly white, scholars);
Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987) (arguing that there is no paradox
in persons at the bottom seeking protection through a rights model even
though rights are illusory).
78. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the
Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 3 (1979); Derrick A. Bell, Jr.,
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 518 (1980); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470
(1976). While they predated the formal creation of CRT as a scholarly movement and endeavor, Professor Bell’s writings on race have been seen as formative to the creation of CRT. See MÖSCHEL, supra note 54, at 44.
79. Freeman, The View from 1989, supra note 12, at 1426–33.
80. Beyond Legitimizing Racial Discrimination and The View from 1989,
Professor Freeman authored another race critique, which was an engagement
with the work of a Derrick Bell text. Alan D. Freeman, Race and Class: The
Dilemma of Liberal Reform, 90 YALE L.J. 1880 (1981) (reviewing DERRICK A.
BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (1980)).
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riously engage the role of race as a phenomenon, not a epiphenome81
non, in this process.

It is for this reason that Professor Freeman’s impact on racecrits is not absolutely clear; even as there were some commonalities, CRT and CLS were not seamless enterprises, without
significant differences in theoretical commitments and ap82
proaches.
An attendee at early CLS conferences, founding CRT
movement member and UCLA/Columbia Law Professor
Kimberlé Crenshaw has extensively articulated the conditions
83
which precipitated the rise of CRT. Consistent with the claims
of Professor Carbado, she notes that there were obvious synergies between CLS and the splinter group of race-crits that
founded CRT. In this vein, Professor Crenshaw has pointed out
that race-crits shared in common the commitment to critically
interrogating the relationship between “law and white supremacy” and “the belief that legal consciousness functioned to legit84
imize social power.” Race-crits, by contrast, “also understood
that race and racism likewise functioned as central pillars of
85
86
hegemonic power.” Ultimately, however, there was a split,
with “CRT emerg[ing] not only as a critical intervention in a
particular institutional contestation over race but also as a race
87
intervention in a critical space, namely CLS.” A significant
reason for this split surrounded a somewhat oppositional approach to rights discourse. For race-crits, it was neither solely
81. Devon W. Carbado, Afterword: Critical What What?, 43 CONN. L. REV.
1593, 1596 (2011).
82. See MÖSCHEL, supra note 54, at 53–56; OBASOGIE, supra note 33, at
186–90.
83. See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT, supra note 19, at xviii–xxvii; Crenshaw, A Foot in a Closing Door,
supra note 57; Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race
Theory: Looking Back To Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 1258–64
(2011) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory] (discussing the emergence of CRT).
84. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT, supra note 19, at xxii.
85. Id. Others have claimed the CLS account of race is more complicated.
See David M. Trubek, Foundational Events, Foundational Myths, and the Creation of Critical Race Theory, or How To Get Along with a Little Help from
Your Friends, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1503 (2011).
86. For the specifics of the split and the rise of the CRT workshop, see
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT,
supra note 19, at xxvi–xxxii; Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory,
supra note 83, at 1262–64, 1288–300.
87. Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory, supra note 83, at
1288.
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about theorizing the limits of rights as a tool to provide remedies, nor merely describing their illusory operation within legal
cases. Rather,
To the emerging race crits, rights discourse held a social and transformative value in the context of racial subordination that transcended the narrower question of whether reliance on rights could alone
bring about any determinate results. Race crits realized that the very
notion of a subordinate people exercising rights was an important di88
mension of Black empowerment . . . .

The CRT concern with CLS approaches, however, was not
89
a wholesale rejection. For instance, both enterprises were
committed to criticizing liberalism’s false promise, and scholars
within both movements “agree that rights discourses are indeterminate and that legal ideals are easy to manipulate, and
90
tend to legitimate racial hierarchy.” Key CLS scholars, however, claim that rights discourses engender hegemony and fail
to offer real opportunities for social change. By contrast, a
number of CRT scholars understand rights not only as a tool to
fight subordination but also essentially concur with a more integral conception of rights as “a symbol too deeply enmeshed in
the psyche of the oppressed to lose without trauma and much
91
resistance.”
Professor Freeman’s work also specifically animated early
CRT critiques of CLS. Of the arguments of Professor Freeman
and other CLS scholars, Professor Crenshaw argued that while
they are useful to understanding the transformative limits of
antidiscrimination law, attempting to apply CLS themes to critiques of subordination and racial power has been a more trou92
bling enterprise. In particular, she asserted that just like
88. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT, supra note 19, at xxiii; see also OBASOGIE, supra note 33, at 189
(“For many minority scholars, this heated discussion over the utility of rights
represented fundamental differences between the social visions embraced by
Critical Legal Studies and those of the racial minorities that would come to
create Critical Race Theory.”); Kennedy, supra note 55, at 184 (“Feminists and
critical race theorists, who took up the critique . . . objected not on the grounds
of totalitarian tendency, but on the grounds that rights really did or should
exist, or on the grounds that it was demoralizing to criticize them.”).
89. See, e.g., Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 764
n.12, 765 n.13, 770 n.20, 777 n.33, 782 n.38 (relying upon and citing to a number of Professor Freeman’s determinations).
90. MÖSCHEL, supra note 54, at 53.
91. Id. at 54 (citing PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS: DIARY OF A MAD LAW PROFESSOR (1991)).
92. See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT, supra note 19, at xxi–xxiv.
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mainstream legal scholarship, CLS failed to “sufficiently account for the effects or the causes of the oppression that they
93
routinely acknowledge.” At bottom, her claim is that CLS
scholars, including Professor Freeman, failed to fully account
94
for how racism shapes American law.
There were other critical assessments of CLS and its engagements with rights discourses and scholars of color. For ex95
ample, founding and preeminent CRT scholars Mari Matsuda,
96
97
Patricia Williams, and Richard Delgado each replied to CLS
insights manifested in Professor Freeman’s articles. Professor
Matsuda took CLS to task for “trashing” rights and overly concentrating on the concept that law is indeterminate. She suggested that CLS should have focused more on the lived experiences of people of color, which demonstrate that a “logical
inconsistency in [an] intellectual argument” does not necessari98
ly result in such a phenomenon in the real world. Professor
Williams’s criticism focused both on a concern for the accessibil99
ity of CLS theories to the disenfranchised, and a skepticism of
its rights critique, noting, “in CLS, I have sometimes been left
with the sense that lawyers and clients engaged in the pursuit
of ‘rights’ are viewed as foolish, ‘falsely conscious,’ benighted, or
100
misled.” Not only does she believe that rights matter to the
101
oppressed, she suggests “[w]hat is needed, therefore, is not
the abandonment of rights language for all purposes, but an attempt to become multilingual in the semantics of each others’

93. Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331,
1356 (1988).
94. Id. at 1356–57.
95. See Matsuda, supra note 77.
96. See Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from
Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987).
97. See Delgado, Ethereal Scholar, supra note 77.
98. Matsuda, supra note 77, at 341; see also Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2320, 2356–57 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech]
(noting the importance of rights to victims and stating, “for it is those on the
bottom who are most hurt by the absence of rights, and . . . who have sustained the struggle for rights in American history”).
99. See Williams, supra note 96, at 403 (“CLS has a good deal of powerful
theory-magic of its own to offer; but I think it has failed to make its words and
un-words tangible, reach-able and applicable to those in this society who need
its powerful assistance most.”).
100. Id. (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 410.
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102

rights-valuation.” Richard Delgado identifies Professor Freeman’s work as prominent to the CLS rights critique, which he
claims, “is the most problematic aspect of the CLS program,
103
and provides few answers for minority scholars and lawyers.”
He further provides that rights do serve a protective function
and CLS provides no program for what should replace this
104
function of rights. Each of these critiques not only highlight a
different approach to rights but also reveal CRT, unlike CLS, to
105
be a reconstructive paradigm.
At times when important scholarship is remembered, there
is a tendency to treat the work as if it was perfect when written
and has so remained throughout time. Reviewed, however,
against this backdrop of the CRT critique, Professor Freeman’s
article translates as somewhat more paradoxical. On the one
hand, in deftly articulating the harms of the perpetrator perspective within antidiscrimination analysis and predicting the
rise of post-race judicial perspectives, his article confirms the
CLS tenet that law works to ratify existing unfair social arrangements. Importantly, these insights still hold significant
meaning for contemporary discussions of race and rights. By
contrast, Professor Freeman neither expressly implicated white
supremacy as the source of failed antidiscrimination efforts nor
troubled how rights might matter differently to Blacks—how it
might be important for minority racial group members to construct themselves as rights-bearing citizens, irrespective of the
102. Id. It is the sentiment in Professor Williams’s work that critical scholars of varying kinds owe each other the duty of doing translation work across
intellectual differences that frames both the challenge and the potential solution for reaching accord across progressive but distinct scholarly movements.
Subject to some limitations, see infra note 106 and accompanying text, Professor Freeman’s article does some of this critical translation work.
103. Delgado, Ethereal Scholar, supra note 77, at 303–04.
104. Id. at 305 (“Rights do, at times, give pause to those who would otherwise oppress us; without the law’s sanction, these individuals would be more
likely to express racist sentiments on the job.”). Race-crits were not the only
scholars to express such concerns. See Richard Michael Fischl, The Question
that Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 779, 780 (1992)
(claiming the question was, “[W]hat would you put in its place?” and suggesting a key concern with CLS was that there was no program for what should
replace the current flawed structure).
105. See Harlan Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
435, 440 (1987); Fischl, supra note 104; Barbara Flagg, Changing the Rules:
Doctrinal Reform, Indeterminacy, and Whiteness, 2 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP.
250, 251 (1995) (“CLS is characterized, if not defined, by its emphasis on deconstructing legal doctrines and accompanying distrust of any reconstructive
or reform effort. In this respect, the agenda of CRT seems diametrically opposed . . . .”).
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106

dangers investing in rights otherwise pose. Perhaps, one of
the important aspects of Legitimizing Racial Discrimination,
then, is that it did not at its core explicate the broader and
more nihilistic CLS rights critique. Rather than engage in an
assessment of the illusory nature of rights more generally, Professor Freeman attempted—supported by CLS commitments—
to describe issues he observed in myriad cases involving race
107
discrimination claims. While it was not always the case in his
108
work, at least in this article, Professor Freeman focused on a
narrower explication of Court-constructed analyses of race bias
and their effects. It is likely one reason that though Legitimizing Racial Discrimination raises some problems from a CRT
perspective, it still has been described by at least one commentator as the meaningful articulation of the CLS position on race
109
and racism. Understood in this light, Professor Freeman’s
106. See MÖSCHEL, supra note 54, at 44 (contrasting Freeman’s perpetrator
and victim perspectives).
107. At least one founder of CRT has described Professor Freeman’s work
in this period as work attempting to explain that since Civil Rights era racial
advances had stalled, a new effort was needed to “combat the subtler forms of
racism that were gaining ground.” DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 19, at
4.
108. See Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest, supra note 53. In this
later piece responding to minority critiques of CLS, he both directly addresses
the illusory nature of rights and discusses prominent CLS critiques as moving
between indeterminacy and contradictions. Id. at 316–23. Importantly, however, his words indicate that he was not so interested in challenging the
claims of race-crits as he was explaining his own positionality:
I regard this essay as the most difficult one I have ever tried to write.
I am writing nervously. I do not wish to be charged, at least unfairly,
with insensitivity, callousness, pretentious intellectualism or even
plain ignorance. Nor do I wish to be either guilty or defensive, though
to be sure both are tempting. To avoid what I see as unproductive
negativity, I am therefore not going to try to refute systematically arguments made in the critique. My goal is simply to offer my comments on the general subject of racism and rights, based on my experiences since I last wrote about the subject.
Id. at 296–97.
109. The following comment on the place of Freeman’s article is representative:
Alan Freeman represents the writer that virtually all persons identify
as the leading spokesman for the CLS response to racism. In fact, his
article Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, stands out as
one of the finest examples of the CLS scholarship, and probably has
had the greatest influence in winning what attention . . . CLS[] has
gained from persons of color.
Andrew W. Haines, The Critical Legal Studies Movement and Racism: Useful
Analytics and Guides for Social Action or an Irrelevant Modern Legal Scepticism and Solipsism?, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 685, 706 (1987) (citation omit-
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key findings regarding the particularized limits of antidiscrimination law, rather than rights more broadly, are not so troubling as to require a complete repudiation. His work was not
inconsistent with a fundamental concept of CRT, which one of
its founders described as a broad-based critique of liberalism
and an attempt to move beyond traditional civil rights move110
ment paradigms. Quite to the contrary, it appears that despite the CLS-CRT split over rights, to include Professor Freeman’s work, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination is still
regarded by some as a “building block in the foundations of
CRT,” whose analysis was “elaborated upon and partially coun111
tered” by CRT scholars.
Ultimately, even though Professor Freeman’s work was
seen as generally belonging to the troubling CLS critique of
rights, the impact of Professor Freeman’s focus on race discrimination over rights talk can be seen as sparking meaningful en112
gagement with the CRT scholarship that followed. In particuted). The truth of this sentiment is partially borne out in the fact that after the
publication of Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, there was no widespread
movement within CLS to engage with race-crits to further articulate its racial
justice project. Not until the much later move by scholars within the law and
society tradition do we see an attempt to craft a left critique inclusive of
sociolegal/empirical and critical perspectives. On this point, see Laura E.
Gómez, Looking for Race in All the Wrong Places, 46 L. & SOC’Y REV. 221
(2012); Laura E. Gómez, A Tale of Two Genres: On the Real and Ideal Links
Between Law and Society and Critical Race Theory, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 453 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004); Osagie K.
Obasogie, Race in Law and Society: A Critique, in RACE, LAW AND SOCIETY
445 (Ian Haney López ed., 2007).
110. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra note 19, at 1.
111. MÖSCHEL, supra note 54, at 44; see also DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra
note 19, at 5–6 (describing Professor Freeman as a principal figure in the rise
of CRT and Legitimizing Racial Discrimination as “a pathbreaking piece that
documented how the U.S. Supreme Court’s race jurisprudence, even when
seemingly liberal in thrust, nevertheless legitimized racism”); Richard Delgado, Liberal McCarthyism and the Origins of Critical Race Theory, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 1505, 1511 (2009) (describing the origins of CRT as emanating from “the
early work of Derrick Bell and Alan Freeman, scholars [who] put forward the
idea that racism is normal, not aberrant, in American society and over time
becomes natural to those living in it”).
112. This is so much the case that Legitimizing Racial Discrimination has
been included in a prominent edited collection of CRT articles and described as
an “important intellectual precursor” to CRT and classic example of CLS
scholarship. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT, supra note 19, at 3. Additionally, early works of CRT scholars engaged Professor Freeman’s work in form and substance. For example, in an
early foundational CRT article, Professor Charles Lawrence expands upon the
critique of Professor Freeman and others that constitutional claims should be
available in disparate impact cases. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,
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lar, Professor Freeman’s claim that courts have used laws designed to ensure equality as tools to instantiate disadvantage,
became a primary framing device in important early CRT work.
Most prominently, within Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw’s germinal article, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, Professor Free113
man’s influence is seen. For example, in that piece Professor
Crenshaw described her goal as challenging the “New Right”
and “New Left” critiques of civil rights, where “New Left” was
represented in the CLS critique of rights and the assertion that
rights were counterproductive means for seeking racial equali114
ty. In addressing Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, she
identifies Professor Freeman’s work as particularly germane:
“Freeman’s central argument is that the severe limitations of
legal reform were dictated by the legitimating role of legal discourse. If law functions to reinforce a worldview that things
should be the way they are, then law cannot provide an effec115
tive means to challenge the present order.” She also, however, provides the central CRT critique of such work in claiming,
“Alan Freeman’s discussion of antidiscrimination law suffers
from a failure to ground the critique in the historical and ideo116
logical conditions that brought about antidiscrimination law.”
While Professor Crenshaw correctly identifies the “What about
racism?” question as the most stark difference between a CRT
and CLS approach to assessing antidiscrimination, this critique
does not deprive Legitimizing Racial Discrimination of its usefulness. This is especially true in the modern era where many
believe racism is all but dead. In the next Part, as a way to explore the commonalities and differences between the movements, both Professor Freeman’s race critique and insights
from foundational works from the CRT canon will be used to
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV.
317, 319 (1987) (citing to Legitimizing Racial Discrimination and other work
critical of the intentional discrimination standard articulated in Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). Professor Lawrence’s frequent co-author, Mari
Matsuda, similarly engaged in work that expanded upon Professor Freeman’s
call to focus on the victim’s perspective. See Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, supra note 98; see also Linda S. Greene, Race in the Twenty-First
Century: Equality Through Law?, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1515 (1990) (adopting, like
in Professor Freeman’s antidiscrimination work, the practice of assessing judicial conduct across a set of race cases).
113. Crenshaw, supra note 93.
114. Id. at 1333–34.
115. Id. at 1352.
116. Id. at 1360.
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analyze race discrimination cases arising since Professor Freeman’s last assessment in 1989.
III. CRT PRINCIPLES AND ANALYZING CASES IN THE
“ERA OF INCREDULITY”
Until this point, the discussion has centered on Professor
Freeman’s work, as a genre-shifting CLS articulation of race
and rights. In this Part, the evolution of antidiscrimination
case law is considered since Professor Freeman last commented
on the subject in 1989. Since that time, the Court has hardened
the post-race perspective Professor Freeman first described. In
order, however, to develop and maintain a contemporary postrace approach to equal protection, the Court has ignored or
found unpersuasive significant amounts of data, empirical and
otherwise, detailing the difference in life outcomes across racial
groups. One might imagine that in order to do so, the Court
would only need to extend the “Era of Denial.” While it is not
wrong to suggest that elements of the “Era of Denial” remain in
the Roberts Court, the level of vitriol behind the refusal of the
Court to see the continuing salience of race reads as something
greater than mere denial. According to Professor Freeman,
“denial implies the existence of a reality to which the Court,
117
through its rhetorical ploys, seeks to prevent our access.”
This definition represents scienter as to the Court depriving us
of awareness of the true implications of a racialized existence.
By contrast, the Court now appears unwilling or, perhaps, unable to believe in the existence of most types of racial bias. For
this reason, rather than terming the Court’s approach as denial, the conduct signals righteous indignation toward most race
claims, more appropriately now described as reflecting an “Era
118
of Incredulity.” While so naming the era does not fully capture the multiple obfuscations that take place within Court ca119
ses considering racial inequality, the phrase does describe a
prominent rhetorical tactic of the most vocal conservative Justices, and one seamlessly connected to rejecting racial salience.
Given that the Court has become increasingly skeptical of
most race-conscious decision making, it is reasonable to think
117. Freeman, The View from 1989, supra note 12, at 1433.
118. Elements of this era are further explained in the below analysis of the
Court’s modern race jurisprudence. See infra Parts III.A–.C.
119. Other names that were considered as also descriptive of current considerations of race in the Court were: “The Era of Revision,” “The Era of Irrationality,” and “The Age of Racial Amnesia.”
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of its current embrace of incredulity as an extension or consequence of its long period of denying the effects of racism. There
is, however, now both a much stronger post-racial rhetoric advanced to justify opinions rejecting the significance of race and
ever-more acrobatic distortions used to explain disadvantages
for minorities as arising from something other than unlawful
disfavor. From one vantage point, the opinions of leading Justices of this era might be said to be particularly invidious. Such
a critique can be premised upon the unseemly tactic of Justices
deploying society’s incomplete racial progress narrative to justi120
121
fy rejection of and outrage over state considerations of race,
even as large swaths of racial minorities live under mean and
122
unfair conditions. Under such a perspective, the Court’s understanding of race is essentially believed to be dishonest, as
their determinations are only defensible at all if the Court invests in revisionist and anti-historical understandings of race.
Such a view ignores, however, the possibility that the incredulous Justices genuinely believe that race lacks salience. While
one could pronounce their statements on race to be either disingenuous or an elaborate ruse, the words of the Supreme
Court Justices themselves suggest the existence of deeply held
commitments.
In various cases in the Court’s recent history, Justices—all
of whom would be associated with the Court’s conservative
wing—have made statements reflecting that race should almost
never be considered by the State. Behind this sentiment is a belief that the ills of racism have largely been ameliorated, such
that people should always be treated “the same.” Justice Scalia—described by Professor Freeman as a “strident” voice that
123
joined the Court during the “Era of Denial” —has endorsed
124
such a framing. For example, in Adarand Constructors, a case
deciding whether strict scrutiny should be applied to govern-

120. See infra note 132 and accompanying text (describing Justice Roberts’
analysis in Shelby County v. Holder).
121. See infra notes 135–39 and accompanying text (describing Justice
Thomas’ disdainful comments and comparisons in Fisher v. University of Texas).
122. See supra note 22. In related scholarship, I have previously challenged
this point of courts and others overinvesting in racial progress narratives. See,
e.g., Mario L. Barnes, “But Some of [Them] Are Brave”: Identity Performance,
the Military, and the Dangers of an Integration Success Story, 14 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 693, 713 (2007); Barnes, supra note 26, at 14.
123. Freeman, A View of 1989, supra note 12, at 1428.
124. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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ment considerations of race, Justice Scalia indicated: “government can never have a ‘compelling interest’ in discriminating
on the basis of race in order to ‘make up’ for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction,” and “[i]n the eyes of the gov125
ernment, we are just one race here. It is American.” More recently, in his concurrence in Ricci v. DeStefano, he described
Title VII disparate impact rules—which are designed to allow
racially disparate results to be used to infer employer motivation—as a “racial thumb on the scales” and suggested that disparate impact alone should not be sufficient to prove the exist126
ence of racial animus. Most recently, in the oral argument in
Fisher II, Justice Scalia exhibited a new tact, suggesting that
considering race may, in fact, be bad for Blacks. Addressing the
counsel for the University of Texas, he stated:
There are those who contend that it does not benefit African Americans to—to get them into the University of Texas where they do not
do well, as opposed to having them go to a less-advanced school, a
less—a slower-track school where they do well . . . .
I’m just not impressed by the fact that the University of Texas
may have fewer [black students if the admissions policy changes].
Maybe it ought to have fewer. And maybe, when you take more, the
number of blacks, really competent blacks, admitted to lesser schools,
turns out to be less . . . . I don’t think it stands to reason that it’s a
good thing for the University of Texas to admit as many blacks as
127
possible.

Although addressing the specific prospects of Blacks may
seem race-conscious, the take away from the comments is that
admitting Blacks to elite schools provides neither a benefit to
them nor the educational environment. This refutation of the
diversity rationale is a decidedly post-race sentiment—one that
125. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
126. 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
127. Dan Roberts, Justice Scalia: Minority Students May Be Better off Going to “Lesser Schools,” GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/
law/2015/dec/09/supreme-court-affirmative-action-fisher-v-university-of-texas.
It appears that Justice Scalia was referring to the data on race and “mismatch”—minorities being admitted to elite institutions for which they purportedly lack qualifications. See RICHARD SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, MISMATCH: HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP,
AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT 4 (2013). Mismatch theory, which
was apparently raised in an amicus brief, was endorsed by Justice Thomas in
his concurrence in Fisher I. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2430–32
(2013). For a critique of mismatch theory, see RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE LAW (2013); William Kidder & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Still Hazy After All of These Years: The Lack of
Empirical Evidence and Logic Supporting Mismatch, 92 TEX. L. REV. 895, 896
(2014).

2070

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:2043

apparently missed the irony of suggesting Blacks would do bet128
ter in separate and lesser quality schools.
Justice Roberts has also provided fairly strong post-race
opinions in at least two cases. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, a case striking down
the use of racial integration plans in Louisville, Kentucky, and
Seattle, Washington, he stated in the plurality opinion: “The
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop dis129
criminating on the basis of race.” More recently, in Shelby
County v. Holder, he ignored significant congressional data de130
tailing the history of racial discrimination in voting, to conclude that Section 4 preclearance requirements of the Voting
131
Rights Act (VRA) are outdated due to the racial progress that
132
has taken place in the country over the last five decades. The
following statement is representative:
Coverage today is based on decades-old data and eradicated practices.
The formula captures States by reference to literacy tests and lower
voter registration and turnout in the 1960s and early 1970s. But such
tests have been banned nationwide for over 40 years. . . . Racial disparity in those numbers was compelling evidence justifying the preclearance remedy and the coverage formula. . . . There is no longer
133
such a disparity.

Justice Thomas too has signaled a significant disbelief in
the need to consider race in myriad contexts. In Shelby County,
he wrote separately in concurrence to additionally attack Section 5 of the VRA. Relying on his concurrence in the Northwest
Austin Municipal Utility District case, he repeated the belief
that “[t]he extensive pattern of discrimination that led the
Court to previously uphold Section 5 as enforcing the Fifteenth
134
Amendment no longer exists.” Justice Thomas also saw no
need to consider race in college admissions in Fisher v. Univer-

128. This is the precise point Gregory Garre, counsel for the University of
Texas, made in response to Justice Scalia: “I don’t think the solution to the
problems with student body diversity can be to set up a system in which not
only are minorities going to separate schools, they’re going to inferior schools.”
Roberts, supra note 127.
129. 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
130. See, e.g., Peter Halewood, Any Is Too Much: Shelby County v. Holder
and Diminished Citizenship, 17 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 66, 66–67
(2015).
131. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa-6 (2012).
132. 133 S. Ct. 2618–22, 2625–26 (2013).
133. Id. at 2627–28 (2013) (citation omitted).
134. Id. at 2632 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util.
Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 226 (2009)).
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135

sity of Texas. On the basic question of how race should matter
to admissions, he opined: “All applicants must be treated equally under the law, and no benefit in the eye of the beholder can
136
justify racial discrimination.” Perhaps more disturbing because of the ways that his personal history should have made
137
skepticism of the existence of racism less likely, his discomfort with the consideration of race in Fisher, further manifested
138
itself in provocative but dubious historical distortions. In that
case, he went so far as to suggest that colleges considering diversity—including racial diversity—for the benefit of the educational environment is similar to the justifications of slaveholders and segregationists, claiming: “There is no principled
distinction between the University’s assertion that diversity
yields educational benefits and the segregationists’ assertions
139
that segregation yielded those same benefits.”
These judicial pronouncements embody a full commitment
140
to the universalist turn in antidiscrimination discourse,
which Professor Freeman described in its nascent phase in Le141
gitimizing Racial Discrimination. As a result of this commitment, the Justices essentially regard all groups as requiring
135. 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013).
136. Id. at 2428–29 (Thomas, J., concurring).
137. Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Angela Onwuachi-Willig,
Judging Opportunity Lost: Assessing the Viability of Race-Based Affirmative
Action After Fisher v. University of Texas, 62 UCLA L. REV. 272, 293 (2015)
(discussing how Justice Thomas addressed the significance of race in his own
autobiography, CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR
(2007)); see also Devon Carbado & Cheryl Harris, The New Racial Preferences,
96 CALIF. L. REV. 1139, 1174–86 (2008) (discussing how race has affected Justice Thomas’s life experiences and accomplishments).
138. See, e.g., Barnes, Chemerinsky & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 137, at
297–303; Mae Kuykendall & Charles Adside III, Unmuting the Volume: Fisher, Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, and the Legacy of Racial Silence, 22 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1019–20 (2014).
139. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2428 (Thomas, J., concurring). In suggesting that
considering race in education should not be treated as a benign consideration,
he pointed out that both slaveholders and segregationists believed that slavery
and segregation, respectively, were good for Blacks. Id. at 2429–30. He made
similar arguments in his concurrence in the Parents Involved plurality, arguing there were similarities between claims in the dissent and claims made by
segregationists. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 773–79 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
140. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes
on Voting Rights After Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2842–47 (2014); john a.
powell, Post-Racialism or Targeted Universalism?, 86 DENV. L. REV. 785, 791
(2008).
141. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1058–
59.
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similar treatment under law, despite the purpose of the different treatment or the disparate histories of the groups being
142
considered. Moreover, the Justices make stark comparisons
between the time when race mattered (then) and our racismfree present. Notably, Justice Roberts uses history to argue in
143
Shelby County that we have moved beyond our racist past. By
contrast, Justice Thomas, in Fisher, uses historical references
to claim that by considering race in admissions, we are attempting to re-inscribe it, but this time against the interests of
persons belonging to groups who receive no preference in ad144
missions. All three Justices are deeply skeptical of government considerations of race and tend to suggest that it is those
who claim the need for race-consciousness who are in fact the
145
racists. Based on these beliefs, very few considerations of race
would be able to withstand a constitutional analysis under
146
strict scrutiny.
While Justices Alito and Kennedy have not made com147
ments about race as stark as these, they have routinely voted
with Justices Scalia, Thomas and Roberts in cases resting on
post-racial principles. It is this explicit hostility to the idea that
race still matters that fuels the “Era of Incredulity.” Cases do
not merely ignore racial consequences, they question how anyone could believe in them. Given the country’s racial progress,
how could race possibly still matter? Additionally, in light of
the oppressive histories surrounding racial consideration, how
could anyone believe in the existence of benign forms of consideration now? It is in this determination that the Justices see
very little possibility that our regrettable racial past haunts our
142. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2431–32; Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
2612, 2618–22 (2013).
143. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2618–22; see also Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2431–
32.
144. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2431–32.
145. See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2618–22; Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2431–32.
146. In fact, ironically, Justice Thomas suggests that very few interests
support government consideration of race, but notes that the “pressing public
necessity” was met by the national security interest advanced in the
Korematsu case. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2423.
147. Justice Kennedy’s status as a more moderate Justice on questions of
race has been somewhat contested. See, e.g., Luis Fuentes-Rowher, The Racial
Metamorphosis of Justice Kennedy and the Future of Civil Rights Law, in THE
NEW BLACK: WHAT HAS CHANGED—AND WHAT HAS NOT—WITH RACE IN
AMERICA 80 (Kenneth W. Mack & Guy-Uriel E. Charles eds., 2013); cf. Russell
K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151 (2016) (discussing the
divergent tacks between Justice Kennedy’s race and sexual orientation jurisprudence).
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148

“e-raced” present, that the explicitly post-race agenda proves
149
so startling. It is with this outsized judicial disbelief as a
starting place, that contemporary cases from the areas of voting, education, and employment—the same areas chiefly considered by Professor Freeman—are next analyzed. While references will be made to the ways in which these cases reinforce
Professor Freeman’s central insights, the primary analytical
frames to be applied are derived from CRT. In particular, attention will be paid to the different tacks the Court now uses to
maintain the post-race status quo and how they track with
CRT theories of racial subordination. As such, in addition to
considering the indeterminacy of law and the Court’s penchant
to concentrate on perpetrators’ rather than victims’ subjectivity, analysis in this modern era places greater emphasis on such
issues as structural inequality and unconscious forms of bias.
Professor Freeman claimed in Legitimizing Racial Discrimina150
tion that his goals were “descriptive and explanatory.” The
aims here will also include insights, drawing upon classic CRT
interventions, which are designed to be more “normative and
151
prescriptive.” Given the limits of this format, it would be implausible to consider every potentially relevant case in the are152
as of voting, employment, and education. Rather, the cases
148. See Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 946, 968 (2002) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence reflects a colorblind conception of race).
149. The race-conscious position adopts a diametrically opposed framework. A good example of this view is seen in Michael Higginbotham’s definition of America’s racial paradigm: “Today’s racial disparities are rooted in a
long-standing paradigm dating back well before the creation of the Constitution. . . . Discrimination and physical separation of blacks, legally and
extralegally, not only has become enmeshed in our social fabric but has prevented us from eliminating racial disparities.” F. MICHAEL HIGGINBOTHAM,
GHOSTS OF JIM CROW: ENDING RACISM IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA 33 (2013).
150. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1050–
51. This choice might, however, also be considered a shortcoming of the article.
Why is Professor Freeman so narrow in his approach? Despite the CRT reconstructive theorizing that is clearly underway by the time he writes A View
from 1989, he offers no broader theoretical intervention in either of his articles
on racial discrimination. Even though he can be criticized for limiting the arc
of his analysis, as argued above, one can see his work as creating openings for
further interventions, particularly those mounted by other scholars with a
closer proximity to the victims of structural inequality. Thank you to my colleague Sameer Ashar for pressing me on this point.
151. Id. at 1051.
152. Additionally, one area that Professor Freeman did not consider broadly and will not be considered here, but in which there are significant racial
disparities in the United States is the criminal justice system. See, e.g., DEAD-
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have been selected for the coverage of particularly significant
issues and the related importance of the opinions.
A. VOTING RIGHTS
While there have been a number of impactful voting cases
since 1989, this Section will focus primarily on two prominent
cases. These cases cover two areas where significant questions
of race are often raised within the voting context—
gerrymandering and the VRA preclearance procedures—and
both provide an opportunity to question whether modern cases
have continued to legitimatize bias through antidiscrimination
law.
153
The first pertinent case is Shaw v. Reno. In Shaw, North
Carolina residents raised an unconstitutional racial gerryman154
dering claim to the state’s revised reapportionment plan.
Consistent with the requirements of Section 5 of the VRA,
North Carolina submitted a reapportionment plan that created
155
one black-majority district. This plan was rejected by the U.S.
Attorney General as not sufficiently addressing racial imbal156
ance within the state. The facially race-neutral revised plan
created two districts, including one that was very oddly-shaped,
157
concentrating a majority of black votes. Plaintiffs claimed
that the districts were allegedly so drawn with the goal of producing two black representatives, which they argued violated
158
the 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause. The white
voters did not claim that the districts diluted the white vote,
rather, they argued “that the deliberate segregation of voters
into separate districts on the basis on race violated their constitutional right to participate in a ‘color-blind’ electoral pro159
cess.” Applying the “unexplainable on grounds other than
LY INJUSTICE:

TRAYVON MARTIN, RACE, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
(Devon Johnson et al. eds., 2015); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011).
153. 509 U.S. 630, 630 (1993).
154. Id. at 636.
155. Id. at 634.
156. Id. at 635. According to the Court, while Blacks constituted twenty
percent of the State’s population, “[t]he black population is relatively dispersed; blacks constitute a majority of the general population in only 5 of the
state’s 100 counties.” Id. at 634.
157. One of the districts was described as “even more unusually shaped. It
is approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no wider than the
I-85 corridor.” Id. at 635.
158. Id. at 637.
159. Id. at 641–42.
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race” standard from the Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
160
Housing Development Corp. case, the Court found the district
to be so irregularly drawn that it could only be rationally
viewed as an effort to segregate races for the purpose of vot161
ing. The Court therefore held that the North Carolina residents’ motion was sufficient to state a claim upon which relief
162
could be granted under equal protection. Essentially, then,
the Court determined that the facially race-neutral plan could
not be understood as “anything other than an effort to separate
163
voters into different districts on the basis of race.” Additionally the Court opined that “[w]hen a district obviously is created
solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial
group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that
164
group.” They remanded the case to the District Court indicating that strict scrutiny should be applied to the plan.
In one way the Shaw majority embodies elements of Freeman’s framework. Consistent with the “Era of Rationalization”
and much like his description of the analysis in the Bakke
165
case, Shaw involves a judicial commitment to colorblindness
that undermines the consideration of race for the purposes of
166
securing racial justice. Just like cases within the “Era of Denial,” in Shaw, a potential claim of reverse discrimination is elevated “to an identical status with claims on behalf of discrimi160. 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
161. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657–58.
162. Id. at 658.
163. Id. at 649. The Court made a similar determination in later cases that
followed Shaw. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 970–71, 985–86 (1996)
(striking down districts in Texas in a 5–4 plurality opinion, for which the
Court determined race was a predominant factor in their creation); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 909 (1995) (following the holding in Shaw in a 5–4 decision striking down a Georgia district called a geographic “monstrosity” because it was deemed to be so highly irregular in shape that it rationally could
not be understood as anything other than an effort to racially segregate voters); cf. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 447 (2006)
(holding in a 5–4 Justice Kennedy opinion that the Texas Legislature’s redistricting plan for District 23 violated the Voting Rights Act, because it had been
redrawn in such a way as to deny Latino voters as a group the opportunity to
elect a candidate of their choosing); Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 258
(2001) (ruling that an allegedly peculiarly shaped district that was created for
political rather than racial reasons does not violate the Constitution).
164. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648.
165. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
166. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657; Freeman, The View from 1989, supra note
12, at 1424–25 (describing Justice Powell’s “rhetoric of colorblindness” in
Bakke).
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nation’s historic and traditional victims.” As a result, reverse
discrimination is treated as “so serious a social problem that we
must offer those aggrieved a chance to vindicate their
168
‘rights.’” As two scholars have suggested recently, as a result
of decisions like Shaw, minority voters and lower courts are left
without a clear understanding on how to proceed:
While the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) was founded with the clear
purpose of increasing the voice and power of minority voters through
their aggregation in majority-minority districts, in a post-Shaw v. Reno . . . world, race is no longer allowed as the “predominant factor” in
redistricting decisions. The Supreme Court has suggested alternatives ranging from a wholesale abandonment of racial classification to
the adoption of race-neutral criteria that nevertheless satisfy VRA requirements. But a coherent doctrine to guide lower courts’ efforts to
protect racial minorities constituting communities of common interest
169
has not yet materialized.

Shaw does more than minimize a commitment to racial
justice, it turns Professor Freeman’s perpetrator/victim dynamic on its head. In a case where Whites are alleged to be the victims, instead of questioning the intent of legislators to protect
the interest of perpetrators, the Court redefines the harm.
Where Justice Souter in dissent argued that the harm should
170
be measured in terms of dilution of the white vote, the Court
reorients its opinion to instead focus on the dangers of a colorconscious process.
With regard to the Shaw case, some insights from CRT
would be somewhat similar to a CLS critique. A significant additional concern, however, would be raised that would be poten171
tially overlooked in a CLS critique —that the Court’s analysis
167. Freeman, The View from 1989, supra note 12, at 1432 (noting that
such an understanding had “turned [law] on its head”).
168. Id. Professor Freeman also saw the Court’s giving credence to reverse
discrimination claims as being derived from it reifying the values of color
blindness. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1066
(“By abstracting racial discrimination into a myth-world where all problems of
race or ethnicity are fungible, the color-blind theory turns around and denies
concrete demands of blacks with the argument that to yield to such demands
would be impossible since every other ethnic group would be entitled to make
the same demand.” (citation omitted)).
169. Ming Hsu Chen & Taeku Lee, Reimagining Democratic Inclusion:
Asian Americans and the Voting Rights Act, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 359, 360
(2013).
170. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 680–81 (Souter, J., dissenting). This inquiry seems
appropriate given the wording of the Fifteenth Amendment, which protects
citizens from having their right to vote abridged or denied due to “race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
171. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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ignored the lived experience of people of color in order to find
government attempts at racial remedy to be as suspect as invidious racial discrimination. It does so by moving away from
the manner the intent standard had been applied in other areas in which minorities had raised constitutional equal protec172
and
tions claims. In cases such as Washington v. Davis
173
McCleskey v. Kemp, both involving facially race-neutral government practices, the Court found no availability to assert a
constitutional claim without specific reference to a particular
actor who intentionally discriminated against a suspect class
member. In these cases, where applying such a precedent
would benefit people of color, the Court refuses to peek under
the veneer of facial neutrality in the law or treat impact as sufficient evidence of intent. Ironically, then, when white voters
claimed to be victimized by reapportionment plans, the Court
abandoned deference to facial neutrality in favor of a more process-focused analysis that suggested race must be operative in
the government’s actions because there were no other bases
174
upon which to explain the shape of the voting district.
The Court’s ability to reach this result seems somewhat
explainable in line with CRT scholarship of two founding members of the movement. First, to invest in such an approach elevates colorblindness in ways that implicate landmark work by
Neil Gotanda, claiming that the concept “fosters white racial
175
domination.” Interestingly, like Professor Freeman, Professor
Gotanda identifies Supreme Court jurisprudence as troubled
framing. Professor Gotanda’s critique, however, explicitly defines the Court’s varying approaches to race and their links to
176
racism as the core problem. Naming racism as an explanation
for why the Court misconstrues the importance of race is one
177
key way in which CLS and CRT critiques differ. A second as172. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (finding no constitutional violation under the
Fourteenth Amendment, where a written personnel test utilized by the District of Columbia Police Department produced a discriminatory impact on racial minorities).
173. 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (refusing to find purposeful discrimination in racial impact data detailing that Blacks who killed Whites were disproportionately more likely to be sentenced to death in a challenge to the administration
of the death penalty in Georgia).
174. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649.
175. Gotanda, supra note 9.
176. Id. at 36–40, 56 (noting that the Court’s colorblindness covers four distinct variants of race: “status-race,” “formal-race,” “historical-race,” and “culture-race”).
177. See supra notes 93–94, 116 and accompanying text.
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pect of the case which implicates early CRT work is that the
Court asks no questions about who is actually disadvantaged or
disenfranchised by a decision to void the reapportionment plan.
According to Professor Mari Matsuda, this involves a failure to
178
“look to the bottom.” Shaw also falls squarely within the description of the “Era of Incredulity.” Rather than denying that
race matters, the Court decides that an apportionment plan
built upon concerns about minority representation is nearly per
se violative of the Constitution. Additionally, electing someone
pursuant to a race-consciousness plan carries with it at least
two unacceptable dangers—presuming that race is a proxy for
political perspective and raising the fear that a minority representative will privilege minority constituents. Framed in this
way, how could anyone defend the thinly veiled use of race in
redistricting? Peculiarly, the Court never frames such questions in the alternative: What is the danger of diverse states
erecting districts that rarely produce successful minority candidates? In the Court’s defense, such a question should not be
asked if race does not matter. It is acceptable, however, to query why the Court does not question the ability of majority white
districts to serve minority interests. Improper racial affinity,
then, appears to only be a concern for elected officials of color.
179
The second voting case is Shelby County v. Holder. In
Shelby County, the Court considered the continuing viability of
the Section 4 Preclearance procedures of the Voting Rights Act
(VRA), but set against a fairly strong Tenth Amendment fram180
ing. Irrespective of the content of the federal statute, the
Court stated that the “equal sovereignty” of states should be

178. Matsuda, supra note 77.
179. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). While the Northwest Austin case preceded
Shelby County, many of the important findings are incorporated into the Shelby County decision. Id. at 2621. However, Northwest Austin failed to answer
the broader question about preclearance. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One
v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204–05 (2009). In Shelby County, the Court commented, “in Northwest Austin, we stated that ‘the Act imposes current burdens and
must be justified by current needs.’ . . . And we concluded that ‘a departure
from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a
statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem
that it targets.’”133 S. Ct. at 2621. This conclusion became a guiding principle
in Shelby County. See id.
180. Id. at 2623–24; see also Bridgette Baldwin, Backsliding: The United
States Supreme Court, Shelby County v. Holder and the Dismantling of Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 17 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 251, 253 (2015) (describing how the Supreme Court framed Shelby County as an example of federal overreach and encroachment upon state power).
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181

breached only in rare circumstances. The case reflects a decidedly “then and now” approach to race. For example, in the
first line of the opinion, Justice Roberts declares that the VRA
was an “extraordinary measure[] to an extraordinary prob182
lem.” Yet, he quickly follows with, “[t]here is no denying,
however, that the conditions that originally justified these
measures no longer characterize voting in covered jurisdic183
tions.” Based on this sentiment, he later states that current
data no longer justify Section 4 Preclearance, and that this is
184
On the counterlargely due to the success of the VRA.
normative aspects of these statements, the following characterization by researcher Pantea Javidan is representative:
181. 133 S. Ct. at 2621. This equal sovereignty analysis, which includes a
presumption that Congress should treat states substantially similarly, notwithstanding important contemporary and historical differences, has been
roundly criticized on a number of grounds. See, e.g., Seth Davis, Equal Sovereignty As a Right Against a Remedy, 76 LA. L. REV 83, 106 (2015) (“The Court’s
equal sovereignty doctrine had a flimsy foundation in precedent. Its failure to
specify the standard of review reflected poor judicial craftsmanship, and its
call for a congressional fix of Section 4 was illusive—or perhaps elusive.” (citation omitted)); Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance:
The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2133–
37 (2015); Leah Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 4) (on file with Minnesota Law Review)
(noting that Congress has at various times distinguished among the states and
that the Court has not given this issue sustained attention).
182. 133 S. Ct. at 2618.
183. Id. Later in the opinion he even suggests that Section 4 procedures
would not have been reauthorized in 2006 if Congress had not so heavily relied
on historical evidence. Id. at 2630. On this topic, he claimed, “[i]t would have
been irrational for Congress to distinguish between States in such a fundamental way based on 40-year-old data, when today’s statistics tell an entirely
different story.” Id. at 2630–31.
184. Germane to this point, Justice Roberts stated:
But history did not end in 1965. By the time the Act was reauthorized
in 2006, there had been 40 more years of it. In assessing the “current
need[]” for a preclearance system that treats States differently from
one another today, that history cannot be ignored. During that time,
largely because of the Voting Rights Act, voting tests were abolished,
disparities in voter registration and turnout due to race were erased,
and African-Americans attained political office in record numbers.
And yet the coverage formula that Congress reauthorized in 2006 ignores these developments, keeping the focus on decades-old data relevant to decades-old problems, rather than current data reflecting current needs.
Id. at 2628–29. That he should espouse such a belief is not surprising, given
his attempts to pare back the VRA during his time as a government attorney
and the skepticism held toward his approach to the VRA by a number of the
legislators that questioned him during the confirmation process. See ARI
BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT: THE MODERN STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS
IN AMERICA 249–51 (2015).
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Shelby County claims that there is sufficient racial progress or transcendence to warrant the elimination of Section 5 voter protections.
In the two main arguments, Chief Justice Roberts quotes his own
opinion in Northwest Austin Municipality Utility District Number
One (2009): (1) “things have changed in the South,” and (2) the “evil
that Section 5 is meant to address may no longer be concentrated in
the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.” In other words, Jim
Crow is over; remedies meant to address systemic subordination and
oppression are antiquated and unnecessarily burdensome. Even if
this argument is unconvincing, Roberts claims that the South should
not be specially scrutinized because voter discrimination does not ex185
clusively occur in the South.

Justice Roberts’ analysis leads to the conclusion that in
covered jurisdictions, such as Shelby County, race no longer
leads to substantial, disparate voting consequences. Justice
Roberts does not quite say that race is absolutely of no moment,
186
just that it no longer matters enough to upset states’ rights.
This sentiment, however, was stated more simply by Justice
Scalia during the Shelby County oral argument, where he said
that the VRA provides for the perpetuation of “racial entitle187
ment.”
Based on Justice Roberts praising the good works of the
VRA, one can clearly see the Shelby County decision as representing a claim of mission accomplished with regard to racial
progress. Professor Freeman also spoke of the Court’s justifying
its decisions by relying upon peculiar readings of history, which
188
also seems relevant here. The Court’s explicit and deep commitments to racial transcendence, however, also are consistent
189
with the “Era of Incredulity.” From this vantage point, given
185. Pantea Javidan, Legal Post-Racialism As an Instrument of Racial
Compromise in Shelby County v. Holder, 17 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y
REP. 127, 129 (2015).
186. In particular, Justice Roberts stated, “At the same time, voting discrimination still exists; no one doubts that. The question is whether the Act’s
extraordinary measures, including its disparate treatment of the States, continue to satisfy constitutional requirements.” Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2619.
187. Gary May, Scalia’s Understanding of the Voting Rights Act Is Shortsighted, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/scalias-understanding-of-the-voting-rights-act-is-shortsighted/2013/
04/26/2b63179e-ad07-11e2-b6fd-ba6f5f26d70e_story.html.
188. See Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest, supra note 53, at 348–49;
Freeman, The View from 1989, supra note 12, at 1412 (describing how the
Court denies the historical reality of why antidiscrimination was crafted).
189. As one scholar has described it, Shelby County is an example of
“[p]ost-racial jurisprudence [which] abandons the policy of race-based remedies for race-based wrongs ‘in favor of seemingly universal solutions.’”
Javidan, supra note 185, at 130 (quoting Cho, supra note 17, at 1601); see also
powell, supra note 140, at 791–99.
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its racial progress, it is ridiculous to suggest that the country is
still burdened with the sins of its racist past. As Justice Scalia
190
suggested in the Shelby County oral argument, those who do
are themselves the problem. Despite claims that he was relying
on representative data on race and voting, Justice Roberts’
opinion was completely inconsistent with the lived experiences
of many Blacks in America. In North Carolina, for example,
191
Blacks made up at least twenty percent of the population but
went ninety years (1902–1992) without electing an African
192
American to Congress. In Alabama, the Shelby County decision cleared the way for the State to pass a voter ID law that
193
has increased voter disenfranchisement. Additionally, drawing on another insight from foundational CRT texts, the Court’s
analysis appears essentialist—i.e., uses broad identity categories to speak to a universal experience of a group without
194
marking other important within-group distinctions —and unconcerned with the fates of voters inhabiting multiple identity
195
categories. Justice Roberts, for example, could not effectively
sell a black progress narrative in the voting rights area if, instead of looking to the experience of Blacks, he considered the
196
more varied experiences of black women. Rather than focus190. See May, supra note 187.
191. See supra note 156.
192. See BERMAN, supra note 184, at 194–95.
193. See Ari Berman, Alabama, Birthplace of the Voting Rights Act, Is Once
Again Gutting Voting Rights, NATION (Oct. 1, 2015) http://www.thenation.com/
article/alabama-birthplace-of-voting-rights-act-once-again-gutting-voting
-rights.
194. See Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools To
Dismantle the Master’s House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 16, 19–22 (1995).
Professor Grillo’s succinct definition provides that “[e]ssentialism is the notion
that there is a single woman’s, or Black person’s, or any other group’s, experience that can be described independently from other aspects of the person—
that there is an ‘essence’ to that experience.” Id. at 19. See generally Angela P.
Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581
(1990).
195. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241,
1251–52 (1991); Grillo, supra note 194, at 17–19.
196. See, e.g., Amber Phillips, The Sad State of Black Women in Statewide
Political Office, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/05/the-sad-state-of-black-women-in-statewide
-political-office. Citing to a Rutgers University report, commissioned by a nonpartisan political organization, the article provided that:
[B]lack women make up 7.4 percent of the U.S. population but just:
•3.4 percent of Congress
•3.5 percent of state legislators
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ing on whether contemporary society continues to be plagued
with precisely the same types of voter suppression that
prompted the passing of the VRA, the Court should have considered whether the “legacy of racial discrimination still per197
meates our society.”
The history of race relations in America is neither a narrative of undisturbed linear progress nor that of a stable phenomenon that remains unchanged. Slavery was followed by a period
of de jure discrimination where formal exclusionary social prac198
tices during Reconstruction, such as Jim Crow and the Black
199
Codes, ultimately resulted in racial segregation in most im200
portant areas of social life. Even though civil unrest, litiga•1.9 percent of mayors in cities of more than 30,000 people
•Less than 1 percent of statewide elected executives (we’ll get to
that last abysmally low number in a minute)
Just one of many sobering statistics in the report: Eighteen black
women serve in congressional delegations in 13 states, and 12 states
have never had a woman—much less one of color—serve in their congressional delegations.
Id. The tendency to speak of Blacks and mean black men or to speak of women
and mean white women has been a topic that has historically occupied feminist critiques outside of law as well. See ALL THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, ALL THE
BLACKS ARE MEN, BUT SOME OF US ARE BRAVE: BLACK WOMEN’S STUDIES
(Gloria T. Hull et al. eds., 1982).
197. Baldwin, supra note 180, at 254 (“Today voter suppression is manifested in the persisting climate of violence targeting racial minorities, strategic disenfranchisement through the criminal justice system and stagnant political representation for citizens of color both in federal and state political
offices.”).
198. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 4 (rev. paperback ed. 2012) (arguing
that the modern mass incarceration of black men is reminiscent of the Jim
Crow era, which is marked by a “comprehensive and well-disguised system of
racialized social control” and an enforced system of segregated “second-class
citizenship”); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 7
(2002) (providing that while the origins of the phrase “Jim Crow” have been
lost, it referred to a system of formal and legal segregation between Whites
and Blacks).
199. The Black Codes, Reconstruction-era statutes, have been described as
follows:
Throughout the former Confederate area, state governments . . . proceeded in 1865 and 1866 to pass legislation regulating the status and
conduct of newly freed Negroes. Termed Black Codes, these laws were
based on the explicit assumption of Negro inferiority and sharply restricted the mobility and personal liberties of former free Negroes and
new freedmen alike.
CIVIL RIGHTS AND AFRICAN AMERICANS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 217 (Albert
P. Blaustein & Robert L. Zangrando eds., Nw. Univ. Press 1991) (1968).
200. Public Accommodations discrimination, at least based on race and national origin, was effectively ended by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which due
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tion victories, such as Brown v. Board of Education, and land201
mark civil rights legislation pared back formal methods of ex202
clusion, racism continues to flourish. One of the most provocative suggestions of CRT luminary Professor Derrick Bell was
that racism is permanent, and that laws should be crafted with
203
this in mind. Instead of struggling with the ways that racism
morphs rather than dies, the Court simply declares improvement to be a sign of victory—never stopping to acknowledge
204
that such victories have been declared since emancipation.
This effect is an example of incredulity being a double-edged
sword. First, the Court is so completely invested in postracialism that it can scoff at those who make claims based on a
belief in racial salience. Alternatively, their universalist narratives are shielded from race-conscious critiques even when the
lived experience of a great many people refute the strength of
the Court’s claims. The net result of the approach is that the
Court co-opts the long-term benefits of the VRA in service to a
to the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, was ironically
premised upon Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause rather than the
Equal Protection Clause. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)
(holding that Congress acted within its power in outlawing racial discrimination in restaurants based on the burden the practice creates for interstate
commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(holding that Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination in public accommodations could impact interstate commerce). Segregation
limited opportunities in everything from housing, education, public accommodation, and labor market participation to private intimacy. On the legality of
segregation, in general, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Legally
sanctioned segregation persisted for many years. For example, education remained segregated until the Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
decision, and interracial marriage was barred in a number of states until the
decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
201. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, were two such important pieces of legislation.
202. See, e.g., Cedric Merlin Powell, Blinded by Color: The New Equal Protection, the Second Deconstruction, and Affirmative Action, 51 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 191, 194 (1997) (“We do not live, nor have we ever lived in a colorblind
nation. We live in a nation blinded by color. America is in the midst of the Second Deconstruction, a period of stagnation and retrenchment following thirty
years of significant gains ushered in by affirmative action.” (citation omitted)).
203. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 10 (1992) (describing a symbiotic existence between Whites
and Blacks where civil rights gains are necessarily followed by set-backs and
declaring that for Blacks “[t]he fact is that, despite what we designate as progress wrought through struggle over many generations, we remain what we
were in the beginning: a dark and foreign presence, always the designated
‘other’”).
204. See Barnes, Chemerinsky & Jones, supra note 22.
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racial success narrative, rather than preserving the Act’s abil205
and their implicaity to address biased voting practices
206
tions.
B. EDUCATION
In Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, Professor Freeman
claims that the “Era of Rationalization” was ushered in by an
207
education case: Milliken v. Bradley. Milliken was a challenge
to the segregated schools in Detroit. Professor Freeman saw the
Court’s refusal to approve an integration plan that extended
beyond the city to capture a number of suburban districts to be
208
a retrenchment from Brown. While there have been a number
209
of meaningful race-related education cases since Milliken,
this Section will consider following influential cases: Grutter v.
210
211
212
Bollinger, Gratz v. Bollinger, Parents Involved, and Fisher
205. Voting rights scholar Atiba R. Ellis provides the following representative refutation of Justice Roberts’ racial progress justification:
As we have seen in our brief discussion of voter identification, this racial progressivity narrative is at odds with the nature of secondgeneration voter denial claims and the demographic reality of twentyfirst century America. Both voter identification laws and felon disenfranchisement laws represent an enduring barrier to the franchise
that falls disproportionately on racial minorities. These barriers have
bred distrust concerning the electoral process, especially among minorities, despite the race-neutral rationale that these policies promote
election integrity. This conflict has clearly created cynicism among
some concerning the underlying integrity of the right to vote as it pertains to minorities.
Atiba R. Ellis, Tiered Personhood and the Excluded Voter, 90 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 463, 488 (2015).
206. According to one commentator,
In 2014, the first post-Shelby election, thousands were turned away
by new restrictions in states like Texas and North Carolina. A 2014
study by the Government Accountability Office found that voter ID
laws in Kansas and Tennessee reduced turnout by 2 to 3 percent during the 2012 election, enough to swing a close vote, with the highest
drop-off among young, black and newly registered voters.
Ari Berman, Opinion, Why the Voting Rights Act Is Once Again Under Threat,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06/opinion/why
-the-voting-rights-act-is-once-again-under-threat.html.
207. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
208. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1107–
08.
209. See United Stated v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992); Missouri v. Jenkins,
495 U.S. 35 (1990).
210. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
211. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
212. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701 (2007).
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213

v. University of Texas at Austin. Ironically, Professor Freeman’s first era—the “Era of Uncertainty”—was marked by cau214
tious optimism, largely due to the result in Brown. With the
exception of Grutter, the Court’s recent considerations of race in
education have done little to push back against the rolling tide
of applying more universal approaches to antidiscrimination
claims.
The Grutter and Gratz cases, which involved the admissions policies for the University of Michigan’s law school and
undergraduate program, respectively, reached very different
outcomes. In Gratz, where the university used a highly formalistic review process which provided additional points to files of
applicants from certain underrepresented minority backgrounds, the Court rejected this practice as overweighting race
in the application process in a manner that violated Title VI of
215
the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause. In
Grutter, by contrast, the Court revisited the decision in
216
Bakke. In a Justice O’Connor opinion that took favorable notice of the law school’s holistic approach to admissions, the
Court reaffirmed the diversity rationale articulated in the
Bakke plurality opinion and held “in the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all
applicants, the Law School’s race-conscious admissions pro217
gram does not unduly harm nonminority applicants.” As important, Justice O’Connor acknowledges in Grutter that race is
still salient: “Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular professional experiences is likely to affect an individual’s views, so too is one’s own, unique experience of being
a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfor218
tunately still matters.”
In recent history, Grutter stands as the lone example of the
Court substantively examining a case on the merits and upholding affirmative action. The case, however, was far from
ideal. First, in dicta, Justice O’Connor mentioned that affirmative action would likely not be needed in twenty-five years—a
213. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
214. See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at
1057–79.
215. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275–76.
216. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (determining, in
a plurality opinion by Justice Powell, when race as one of several factors could
be considered in higher education admissions).
217. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003).
218. Id. at 333.
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comment Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, attempted
219
to recast as a hardened limit. Second, the case was likely as
much about the military and business interests in hiring diverse employees as it was about preserving economic oppor220
tunity for students and educational freedom for institutions.
It certainly did not engage in more provocative theorizing, such
as addressing whether the multiple and potentially lifechanging effects of an education, transform admissions deci221
While Professor Freeman likely
sions into political acts.
would have appreciated the outcome in Grutter as representative of an acceptable remedy to ongoing societal discrimination,
it would likely still be problematic. First, Professor Freeman
challenged the Bakke opinion as constructing a false equivalence whereby, “in the name of a diversity that equates race
with being a ‘farm boy from Idaho,’ admissions programs could
222
continue to admit students on the basis of race.” Second, a
hallmark of the “Era of Rationalization” was the Court moving
to contain cases that provided benefits to victims of discrimina223
tion. The reading of Grutter applied in the Parents Involved
plurality and the first decision in Fisher appear to confirm
224
this.
The CRT critique of Grutter is equally skeptical. While a
number of scholars have critiqued the limits of the diversity ra-

219. Id. at 351 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Second, I agree with the Court’s holding that racial discrimination in higher education admissions will be illegal in 25 years.”).
220. Id. at 330–31.
221. See Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals As Political Acts:
Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 115
(2003) (“Admissions decisions affect the individuals who apply, the institutional environments . . . and the stability and legitimacy of our democracy.
They are political as well as educational acts.”).
222. Freeman, The View from 1989, supra note 12, at 1425 (citation omitted).
223. In particular, he criticized the Court for refusing to extend the disparate impact standard from Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), to
constitutional complaints. Freeman, The View from 1989, supra note 12, at
1422–24. He noted a similar phenomenon in the “Era of Denial,” for cases retreating from an earlier decision protecting a work-place affirmative action
plan. See infra notes 247–55 and accompanying text. At bottom, these forms of
retrenchment are consistent with Professor Freeman’s broader claim that color-blind theory “exerts an insistent pressure” that for any deviation from raceneutral norms, the Court “limit[s] their duration to facilitate a quick return to
the comfortable, abstract world of colorblindness.” Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1067 (citation omitted).
224. See infra notes 232–46 and accompanying text.
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225

tionale, Grutter also stands as a prominent example of Der226
rick Bell’s theory of interest-convergence. The basic premise
of interest-convergence is that rights for people of color will be
“recognized and protected when and only so long as policymakers perceive that such advances will further interests that are
227
their primary concern.” Hence, gains for Blacks only persist
228
to the extent that they include benefits for Whites. Of the
Michigan affirmative action cases and interest-convergence,
Professor Bell, himself, stated:
Actually, the Michigan decisions should provide me with some measure of a prophet’s pride. For more than two decades, I have been writing and teaching that no matter how much harm blacks were suffering because of racial hostility and discrimination, we could not obtain
meaningful relief until policymakers perceived that the relief blacks
sought furthered interests or resolved issues of more primary concern. Read together, Grutter and Gratz provide a definitive example
229
of my Interest-Convergence theory.

Specifically, the interest-convergence thesis was implicated
by the business and military interests noted above, which Professor Bell also recognized as the true drivers of Justice
230
O’Connor’s opinion. In the end, then, though affirmative action is preserved, “blacks and Hispanics are the fortuitous ben-

225. See Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622,
1622 (2003) (“[T]he concept of diversity, far from a viable means of ensuring
affirmative action in the admissions policies of colleges and graduate schools,
is a serious distraction in the ongoing efforts to achieve racial justice.”); Maurice C. Daniels & Cameron Van Patterson, (Re)considering Race in the Desegregation of Higher Education, 46 GA. L. REV. 521, 527 (2012) (“While increasing diversity enriches the academic environment and enhances the curricular
aims of education, the legal and rhetorical emphasis on diversity sidesteps the
more challenging social issues of race and class inequality.”); Osamudia R.
James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale on
White Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 425, 450 (2014) (“[T]he diversity
rationale . . . has been challenged for failing to genuinely advance racial justice, for primarily benefiting white institutions instead of students of color, for
legitimizing admissions policies that favor the privileged, and for potentially
pitting minority groups against each other.”); Eboni S. Nelson, Examining the
Costs of Diversity, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 602–18 (2009) (discussing diversity as costly to the educational opportunity of minority children).
226. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education
and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
227. DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 49 (2004).
228. While the interest-convergence thesis has been a foundational concept
within CRT, it has been recently revisited and challenged. See Justin Driver,
Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 149 (2011).
229. Bell, supra note 225, at 1624 (citation omitted).
230. Id. at 1625.
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eficiaries of a ruling motivated by other interests that can and
likely will change when different priorities assert them231
selves.”
Though Grutter spared affirmative action in higher education admissions, the case has provided little reason to expect
that the Court is committed to consistently interpreting antidiscrimination laws for the benefit of historically oppressed
groups. Two education cases that attempted to build upon the
Grutter holding, Fisher and Parents Involved, bear this out. In
Fisher, plaintiffs sought to challenge the Grutter Court’s embrace of the diversity rationale by questioning a university’s
ability to employ race-conscious admissions protocols alongside
race-neutral practices in its undergraduate admissions. Rather
than deciding the constitutionality of such a plan, the Court
remanded the case and directed the lower court to more care232
fully apply the strict scrutiny standard. The concurrences in
the case, however, shed considerable light on the more hostile
posture of a number of Justices toward affirmative action in
education. Justice Scalia, for example, wrote only to say that
while the question was not before the Court in Fisher, he would
vote to overrule the Grutter holding that the diversity rationale
233
As mentioned
satisfies the compelling interest standard.
above, Justice Thomas not only expressed a similar sentiment
with regard to overruling Grutter, but he did so by invoking a
number of troubling and provocative analogies between modern-day supporters of affirmative action, and slave holders and
234
segregationists. Notably, it was in response to language in
the Respondent’s brief indicating that America had not reached
an aspirational colorblind future, that Justice Thomas clearly
stated his position: “Yet again, the University echoes the hollow
235
justifications advanced by the segregationists.” Interestingly,
although there is now at least a generation of students whose
lives have been positively altered through expanded educational opportunity, and some current studies suggest that race236
conscious affirmative action remains beneficial, these types of
231. Id.
232. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421–22 (2013). The Court,
however, did state that the lower court should not defer to the University’s
good faith determinations in deciding whether the plan was narrowly tailored.
Id. at 2421.
233. Id. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring).
234. Id. at 2426–30 (Thomas, J., concurring).
235. Id. at 2428.
236. See KENNEDY, supra note 127, at 216; Michal Kurlaender & Eric
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data points are not likely to significantly sway a majority of the
Court.
In Fisher, the Court refused to endorse a liberal reading of
the appropriate consideration of race in higher education admissions; Parents Involved, by contrast, limited the application
of Grutter outside of the higher education context. The case
sought to extend the diversity rationale from higher education
affirmative action cases into the primary/secondary school integration context, but the Court struck down race-conscious voluntary assignment plans from Seattle, Washington, and Jeffer237
son County, Kentucky. Finding that such cases were not
governed by Grutter and applying strict scrutiny, the Court determined that racial diversity was not a compelling interest
that could justify race-based student selections for high school
238
admittance. The Court held that the plans were also not narrowly tailored, in that the interests the districts sought to
239
achieve did not justify the methods selected to achieve them.
While a number of scholars have pointed to Justice Roberts’
controversial claim in Parents Involved that racial disadvantage would continue to flourish as long as race was consid240
ered, he also articulated a peculiar relationship between the
case and Brown: “Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where
they could and could not go to school based on the color of their
skin. The school districts in these cases have not carried the
heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once

Grodsky, Mismatch and the Paternalistic Justification for Selective College
Admissions, 86 SOC. EDUC. 294, 306 (2013) (using data from post-Proposition
University of California campuses to determine that so-called “mismatched”
students “are no more likely to leave in their first four years prior to earning a
degree than are regularly admitted students”); Adriane Kayoko Peralta, A
Market Analysis of Race-Conscious University Admissions for Students of Color, 93 DENV. U. L. REV. 173, 212–17 (2015).
237. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 747–48 (2007).
238. Id. at 731–33.
239. Id. at 735. Interestingly, one way Justice Roberts criticizes the Jefferson County plan is that the necessity of using a racial classification in Louisville is undermined by its “minimal impact” on enrollment. Id. at 734. This
seems odd given that it was the success of race-specific measures that lead to
his striking down Section 5 of the VRA. See Javidan, supra note 185.
240. See Joel K. Goldstein, Not Hearing History: A Critique of Chief Justice
Roberts’s Reinterpretation of Brown, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 791, 796–97 (2008);
Wendy Parker, Limiting the Equal Protection Clause Roberts Style, 63 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 507, 520–21 (2009).
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241

again—even for very different reasons.” Two CRT critiques of
the Roberts opinion in Parents Involved are particularly poignant. On the dubious nature of Justice Roberts ignoring the reality of race for the affected children, CRT founding member
Charles Lawrence III opines, “Chief Justice Roberts says he
sees no color (blackness) in these families’ faces, except that
which the school districts’ plans have painted and the Constitu242
tion compels him to erase.” On the opinion’s cramped consideration of race more broadly, Berkeley Law scholar john a.
powell refers to it as “callous” and so narrow that “racial hierarchy is legally irrelevant to the Constitutional principle of
Equal Protection unless state-sponsored, conscious discrimina243
tion is directly implicated and is a proximate cause.”
Taken together, these cases represent an uneven approach
to race that flourishes in a post-race society. As such, even
when there are small gains, they cannot overcome the effects of
our long history of maintaining a racial spoils system that results in only pyrrhic advances. Ultimately, it seems that raceconscious practices must yield to attachments to false univer244
salism. The only real difference between the time Professor
Freeman wrote his pieces and now is the framing. In the “Era
of Denial,” the framing suggested that courts ignored the power
245
of race to disadvantage when they shouldn’t. Courts in the
“Era of Incredulity” turn racism on its head, such that every
consideration of race, even those attempting to undo historical
racial disadvantage, is viewed as toxic. It is for this reason that
it is highly unlikely that the Roberts Court will defer to the di246
versity rationale much longer. The framing makes those who

241. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas
also compares Parents Involved to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), in so far as he claims that the racial imbalance in the affected schools
is not tantamount to segregation. Id. at 748–49.
242. Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on
the Impact and Origins of “The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection,” 40 CONN. L.
REV. 931, 937 (2008) (citation omitted).
243. powell, supra note 140, at 787.
244. See id. at 795–97.
245. Freeman, The View from 1989, supra note 12, at 1426–33.
246. For example, in discussing diversity in Parents Involved, Justice Roberts noted that “[r]acial balancing is not transformed from ‘patently unconstitutional’ to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial diversity.’” Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 732. Moreover, Fisher v. University of Texas,
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2003), is returning to the Court in this current term, where
the viability of the diversity rationale may be tested once more. Max Kutner,
Affirmative Action Returning to the Supreme Court, NEWSWEEK (June 29,
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are interested in asserting that race matters the problem.
Those that believe in race-consciousness therefore become the
new slaveholders, segregationists, and discriminators.
C. EMPLOYMENT
In The View from 1989, Professor Freeman spent most of
247
his analysis of the “Era of Denial” on employment cases. Toward the end of the “Era of Rationalization,” the Court upheld
248
United Steelworkers v. Weber, a case involving a collective
bargaining agreement that outlined an affirmative action program in an aluminum plant where Blacks made up a significant portion of the workforce but less than 2% of the skilled
249
craftworkers. Despite the Weber holding, the “Era of Denial”
was marked by cases representing a systematic repeal of most
250
workplace affirmative action. According to Professor Free251
man, cases such as Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,
252
253
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, Martin v. Wilks, and
254
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., repudiated the “implicit
principles” of cases such as Weber and Griggs. Of Wards Cove,
in particular, he claimed it “obliterates the assumption . . . that
serious statistical disparities are presumptive violations of Ti-

2015), http://www.newsweek.com/affirmative-action-case-returning-supreme
-court-348157.
247. See Freeman, The View from 1989, supra note 12, at 1426–33.
248. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
249. Freeman, The View from 1989, supra note 12, at 1425–26.
250. See id. at 1426.
251. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (finding that a mismatch between the percentage
of minority students and the percentage of minority teachers did not justify
the consideration of race in a teacher layoff plan, and that racial preferences
had to be based on prior discrimination).
252. 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (holding that a racial disparity across one class of
jobs does not itself prove that the firm practices discriminatory hiring, and
that the relevant inquiry should focus on the qualified minority pool in the labor force rather than the percentage of minority employees).
253. 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (allowing white firefighters to challenge a consent
decree between the City of Birmingham and black firefighters, even where the
white firefighters had not been party to the original litigation).
254. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that unspecified claims of past racial discrimination did not justify the implementation of a system of racial quotas in
the awarding of public contracts and that strict scrutiny was the proper
standard to review such cases). Of Weber and germane to Professor Freeman’s
thesis, Gary Peller claimed: “In our times, conservatives utilize the very rhetoric of tolerance, color-blindness, and equal opportunity that once characterized
progressive discourse to mark the limits of reform.” Peller, supra note 89, at
762.
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255

tle VII.” Importantly, at the end of this line of cases, the
Court had done away with the idea that state and local governments engaging in so-called benign discrimination—
considerations of race designed to benefit rather than harm
minorities—would be subject to less rigorous scrutiny than oth256
er classifications. The net effect of this approach was to subject attempts at remedial considerations of race to the same judicial review as those with an invidious purpose. This move
alone nearly ensures the primacy of Professor Freeman’s perpetrator perspective.
In response to some of the holdings in the employment cases noted above and in an effort to set new standards for suits
257
filed under Title VII and Section 1981, Congress passed the
258
Civil Rights Act of 1991. Notably, to address issues raised by
the Wards Cove decision, the Act codified the disparate impact
259
claim articulated in Griggs and provided that discrimination
260
could be proven through direct evidence or indirect means.
Though Congress can alter antidiscrimination statutes, the
261
Court both interprets the constitutionality of that legislation
and sets the standards for claims directly premised upon the
262
It is not surprising, then, that neither the
Constitution.
changes in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, nor previously helpful
263
precedent, ultimately ceased the demise of affirmative action
255. Freeman, The View from 1989, supra note 12, at 1431. At least one
Justice has now explicitly called for limiting the presumed meaning of disparate impact evidence in Title VII cases. See supra note 126 and accompanying
text.
256. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 495.
257. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012). Enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, Section 1981, in part, authorizes complainants to sue to make or enforce
contracts, including employment contracts.
258. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166., 105 Stat. 1071.
259. With regard to disparate impact, the Act provides that a plaintiff establishes a prima facie violation by demonstrating an employer has engaged in
“a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)
(2012).
260. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (providing
a burden-shifting formula later codified by the “indirect means” language in
the Civil Rights Act).
261. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 167 (1803) (describing the roles
and powers of the judicial branch).
262. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312–13 (1987); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 299, 248–52 (1976).
263. See, e.g., Metro Broad. Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 600 (1990) (using
intermediate scrutiny to approve FCC minority preference policies for the consideration of awarding broadcast licenses); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
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in employment and government contracting. In this vein, the
most relevant decision in the “Era of Incredulity” is Adarand
264
Constructors v. Pena. In Adarand, the Court had an opportunity to maintain a relaxed standard for reviewing federal
race-based affirmative action. The government contracting provisions at issue in Adarand provided additional compensation
for prime contractors who contracted with sub-contractors operated by “socially and economically disadvantaged individu265
als.” Under this provision, minority-operated businesses were
266
presumptively deemed socially disadvantaged. Plaintiff sued
after a minority-owned business received the sub-contract, alt267
hough it did not offer the lowest-priced bid. Asserting that
the Equal Protection Clause was designed to protect persons
not groups, the Court struck down the policy and did so using
268
strict scrutiny. As such, it overruled Metro Broadcasting,
which had previously applied intermediate scrutiny to a federal
269
affirmative action policy. The fate of Adarand, however, was
likely sealed with the earlier Croson decision. In Croson, Justices Thomas and Scalia espoused strong commitments to anticlassification, stating that dividing people by race is inherently
problematic because doing so promotes “notions of racial inferi270
ority or simple racial politics.”
Affirmative action in the workplace has not been the only
casualty of the Court’s current approach to antidiscrimination.
The assault on statutory disparate impact claims continued after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Most recently,
271
the Court considered disparate impact in DeStefano v. Ricci.
In 2003, based on a belief that test results would lead to a disparate impact suit from black test-takers, New Haven city officials discarded a written/oral test used to promote firefighters.
Whites, as a group, had outperformed minorities on the test;
seventeen firefighters—sixteen white and one Hispanic—who
448, 490 (1980) (approving, as a legitimate exercise of government power, a
spending provision that required ten percent of federal funds going towards
public works programs to go to minority-owned companies).
264. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
265. Id. at 204.
266. Id. at 207.
267. Id. at 204–05.
268. Id. at 227.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 226–27 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S.469,
493 (1989)).
271. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
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believed they were likely to be promoted based on their performance on the test sued the City. The suit alleged that the City
created a disparate impact upon the plaintiffs in violation of Ti272
tle VII and the Equal Protection Clause. The Court held that
the City’s actions were impermissible under Title VII, as it did
not “demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not
taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate273
impact statute.” This seemed an odd determination given the
poor history of integration of the New Haven Fire Department
and the disproportionately low numbers of Blacks and Hispan274
ics among the ranks of lieutenant and captain. Essentially,
the Court determined that a negative effect on minorities alone
was not sufficient evidence of the merits of a potential disparate impact claim. As other scholars have suggested, with such a
finding the Court is, de facto, reading an intent requirement in275
to disparate impact analysis, and shifting the Title VII statutory standard into something akin to the approach applied for
276
constitutional rather than statutory claims.
In his work, Professor Freeman identified the winnowing of
disparate impact protection as a major problem within antidis277
crimination law. He situated the demise in the rise of color
blindness, which led to reverse discrimination cases where the
Court applied universal approaches to race that ignored the
278
Professor
special history and status of minority victims.
Freeman’s analysis is compatible with early CRT scholarship
279
assessing the Court’s disregard of impact evidence. At least
since Professor Charles Lawrence’s foundational article, The Id,
272. Id. at 563.
273. Id.
274. See Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano: Diluting Disparate Impact
and Redefining Disparate Treatment, 12 NEV. L.J. 626, 627 (2012).
275. Id. at 629–32; see also Reva B. Siegel, Race-Conscious but RaceNeutral: The Constitutionality of Disparate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66
ALA. L. REV. 653, 665–68 (2015) (describing Ricci and its role in disparate impact jurisprudence).
276. See Girardeau A. Spann, Disparate Impact, 98 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1135
(2010).
277. See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2. While
the Court has been cautious about expanding disparate impact analysis over
the years, one recent case made the approach available within a different
statutory context. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys.
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015) (recognizing the availability of disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act).
278. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2; Freeman,
A View from 1989, supra note 12.
279. Lawrence, supra note 112, at 321–22.
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the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Bi280
as, critical scholars have been critiquing these positions. Like
Professor Freeman, Professor Lawrence’s work calls for a
broader use of disparate impact evidence. Using social science
evidence on unconscious bias, Professor Lawrence suggests that
the Court’s antidiscrimination precedent has included a mal281
adaptive intent requirement. In revisiting this work, Professor Lawrence indicated that the central point of the article was
to address something else that is relevant to modern analysis of
282
race: the cultural meaning of racial texts. As Professor Lawrence surmises, “white supremacy is maintained not only
through the intentional deployment of coercive power, but also
through the creation, interpretation, and assimilation of racial
283
text.” Antidiscrimination law, then, does not fail merely because judges neutrally and objectively uncloak meaning in a legal contest. This is a point that Professor Freeman and CRT
scholars would likely agree upon: for antidiscrimination decisions, the choice of framing, and the theory of racial justice that
animates judicial decisions, are an entrenched part of the problem.
Under the current framing of disparate impact, the negative life opportunities that were once considered a side effect of
workplace discrimination are now viewed as being largely tied
284
to personal failings. Georgetown Law Professor Gerry Spann
has described the reliance on such assumptions as “post-racial
285
discrimination.” Professor Spann, however, makes clear that
the Ricci decision is but one example of the phenomenon:
When Ricci is considered in conjunction with other Roberts Court decisions concerning voting rights, racial profiling, English language
280. Id.
281. Id. at 325.
282. Lawrence, supra note 242, at 938–39.
283. Id. at 939. See also HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 62, at 126 (“In addition
to legitimating race, legal rules operate as an idea-system to construct races . . . . Though race as a social concept has some autonomy, it is always
bounded in its meanings by the local setting.”).
284. See Barnes, supra note 26, at 14 (describing post-racialism as “buttressing a story about colorblindness, meritocracy and individual responsibility” and “creat[ing] the expectation that each person is responsible for his or
her own success or lack thereof”).
285. Spann, supra note 276, at 1142; see also Haney López, Colorblind, supra note 9 (describing his compatible concept of Spann’s “post-race racism”);
Tukufu Zuberi, Critical Race Theory of Society, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1573, 1587
(2011) (describing “post-racial blindness” which occurs when “[t]he post-racial
rhetoric of this moment serves as a powerful mask over the racial realties that
persist”).
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education, and school resegregation, the Roberts Court’s race cases
seem to fit neatly into the pattern of Supreme Court hostility to racial
minority interests that is becoming the hallmark of postracial dis286
crimination.

This approach is also a touchstone of the “Era of Incredulity.” It is the refusal to acknowledge the vast array of hidden
forms of bias that allows the Court to pronounce racism dead.
Poor life outcomes for people of color, then, are either attributable to the failures of would-be victims or a happenstance for
which neither blame nor remedy should attach. As a result, the
Court, for many, seems correct to show disdain for raceconscious measures.
The larger consequence of the outsized disbelief in the realness of race is that racism only exists for the Court principal287
ly as a function of the aberrant conduct of individual outliers.
Under such a model, the Court avoids interrogating larger concerns such as structural racism and white supremacy. One goal
of CRT scholars and others has been to identify the manner in
which discrimination is perpetrated through other than indi288
vidual means. In a manner that de-emphasizes claims to
289
white innocence, the CRT approach focuses on explicating institutional or structural racism. Ian Haney López defines institutional racism as a “theory of racism that explains organizational activity that systematically harms minority groups even
though the decision-making individuals lack any conscious dis290
criminatory intent.” Similarly, Professor Roy L. Brooks has
described structural discrimination as “discriminatory effects”
286. Girardeau A. Spann, Postracial Discrimination, 5 MOD. AM. 26, 26
(2009).
287. See Barnes, Chemerinsky, & Jones, supra note 22, at 968 (defining
post-racialism as “a set of beliefs that coalesce to posit that racial discrimination is rare and aberrant behavior as evidenced by America’s and Americans’
pronounced racial progress”); powell, supra note 140, at 789 (noting post-racial
proponents assert that “a few old-style racists may remain, especially in the
South, but they, like many civil rights activists, are still stuck in the old paradigm from the past”).
288. See, e.g., DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 19, at 79–80 (“Many critical race theorists and social scientists alike hold that racism is pervasive, systemic, and deeply ingrained.”).
289. Id. at 80.
290. Ian F. Haney López, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a
New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1723 (2000); see also Jeff Nesbit, At the Edge: Institutional Racism Is Our Way of Life, US NEWS
(May 6, 2015, 1:16 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/at-the-edge/2015/
05/06/institutional-racism-is-our-way-of-life (presenting several examples of
skewed racial results from social institutions, especially in the areas of policing and the criminal justice system more broadly).
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or discriminatory treatment “not motivated by an antecedent
291
racial animus, and to that extent . . . ‘facially neutral.’” While
animus may not be intended, institutional policies and practices are often captured by negative racial stereotypes. As a recent
empirical study of police stops has articulated: “[s]ome institutional structures of law and official policy ameliorate or oppose
negative racial stereotypes, as is the case with civil rights law.
Other institutional structures build on and accentuate these
292
negative stereotypes . . . .” As a result, the researchers posit
that “institutionalized racial framing” effectively serves the
purpose of activating “culturally embedded racial stereo293
types.”
The net results of institutional racism are myriad and serious. First, consistent with Professor Freeman’s claims, the
294
Court overly focuses on individual conduct and intent. Second, society behaves as if disproportionately negative
racialized consequences for minorities in important areas of social life are not caused by racism or white supremacy. Finally,
this approach masks another phenomenon identified by
groundbreaking, early CRT work: UCLA Law Professor Cheryl
Harris’s theory of “whiteness as property.” Of the advantages of
whiteness, she states:
The relative economic, political, and social advantages dispensed to
whites under systematic white supremacy in the United States were
reinforced through patterns of oppression of Blacks and Native Americans. Materially, these advantages became institutionalized privileges, and ideologically, they became part of settled expectations of
295
whites . . . .

And while whiteness also functions as an identity, Professor Harris clarifies that it does so much more in that it also
functions as a “reputation in the interstices between internal
and external identity; and, as property in the extrinsic, public,
291. ROY L. BROOKS, RACIAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF OBAMA 43 (2009).
292. CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE
RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 50 (2014).
293. Id. at 50–51.
294. In discussing the perpetrator perspective, Professor Freeman
acknowledged the Court’s failure to address institutional racism. Freeman,
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1054 (“[P]erpetrator perspective presupposes a world composed of atomistic individuals whose actions
are outside of and apart from the social fabric . . . . From this perspective, the
law views racial discrimination not as a social phenomenon, but merely as the
misguided conduct of particular actors.” (citations omitted)). He, however,
failed to expand on this discussion.
295. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1777
(1993) (footnote omitted).
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296

and legal realms.” In a world where race is of so little importance and whiteness is rarely regarded a marker of racial
297
stigma, the value of the property interest is both seamless
and overwhelming. As Duke sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva
explains, in racialized systems a hierarchy is produced whereby
the “race placed in the superior position tends to receive greater economic remuneration and access to better occupations
and/or prospects in the labor market, occupies a primary position in the political system, is granted higher social estima298
tion.” Professor Freeman started to mark the outlines of a
system that has now been rendered untouchable by the modern
Court failing to ever conceptualize race in this more sophisticated manner.
Given the Court’s disposition in the above cases, it should
come as no surprise that attempts to expand previously adopted antidiscrimination approaches within employment have also
been rejected. One such example pertains to the mixed motive
or motivational factor approach in discriminatory treatment
299
cases. Under that standard, rather than having to prove that
improper bias was the sole motivation for an employer’s actions, a plaintiff can assert that unlawful bias partially ex300
plains the employer’s adverse decision. Recently, however,
the Court rejected an expansion of this standard from the stat301
ute’s status-based discrimination section to retaliation cases.
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v.

296. Id. at 1725. Harris notes further that “[a]ccording whiteness actual
legal status converted an aspect of identity into an external object of property,
moving whiteness from privileged identity to a vested interest.” Id.
297. CRT scholars, in fact, have commented that Whites have the privilege
of seeing themselves as not having a race. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note
19, at 80; Barbara J. Flagg, The Transparency Phenomenon, Race-Neutral
Decisionmaking, and Discriminatory Intent, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES:
LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 220 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds.,
1997) (“In this society, the white person has an everyday option not to think of
herself in racial terms at all. In fact, whites appear to pursue that option so
habitually that it may be a defining characteristic of whiteness: to be white is
not to think about it.”).
298. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 465, 469–70 (1997).
299. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (allowing a
plaintiff to sue in a Title VII disparate treatment case where the protected status was a “motivating” or “substantial” factor in the employer’s decision).
300. See id.
301. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
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Nassar, a plaintiff of Middle Eastern descent brought a Title
VII suit claiming discrimination “on account of his religion and
ethnic heritage, a bias manifested by undeserved scrutiny of his
billing practices and productivity, as well as comments that
303
‘Middle Easterners are lazy.’” After filing a complaint, the institution blocked his transfer to a new job and the plaintiff al304
leged it did so in retaliation. In Nassar, the Court considered
whether motivational factor analysis can be used in a retaliation case filed under Title VII and held that in such cases there
must be a demonstrable causal link between the injury sus305
tained and the wrong alleged. Although the motivating factor
standard was codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Court
reads Congress as requiring that the causal link in retaliation
306
cases only be satisfied by a “but-for” standard of causation. In
addition to its interpretation of congressional intent, the Court
justifies not relaxing the causation standard by arguing that
doing so would excessively increase employer liability and re307
sult in a larger number of frivolous claims.
There are a number of issues with the Court’s analysis in
Nassar. First, the Court presented no evidence to support the
claim that expanding motivational factor analysis to cover retaliation claims would result in greater numbers of fraudulent
308
or frivolous claims. The Court also does not provide a coherent articulation of why a causation analysis Congress found
suitable for disparate treatment claims, based on one’s protected status, somehow becomes so ill-advised when the basis of
the complaint shifts to a claim of retaliation—alleged to arise in
response to the filing of an underlying status discrimination
309
claim. As for motivating factor analysis, itself, why is it not
302. Id. The Court’s decision should not have been terribly surprising, given that it had previously declined to extend motivating factor analysis to
claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). See
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175–77 (2009).
303. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2523.
304. Id. at 2524.
305. Id. at 2526.
306. Id. at 2521 (“[T]he proper conclusion is that Title VII retaliation
claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the
challenged employment action.”).
307. Id. at 2531–32.
308. See Sandra F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Fakers and Floodgates, 10
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 223, 234–39 (2014) (discussing the Court’s lack of evidence for increased, frivolous claims).
309. On the illogical and counterintuitive nature of this difference and its
consequences, see Kimberly A. Pathman, Protecting Title VII’s Antiretaliation
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possible for an employer to take actions against a complaining
employee based on both legitimate and retaliatory reasons
simultaneously? One way to explain the Court’s decision consistent with CRT principles and post-racial politics is to suggest
that the Court constructs the employer through the lens of
white innocence. Consequently, there is a significant likelihood
that retaliation claims represent employers being subjected to
racism allegations the Court believed to be typically overblown
or fraudulent. In this case, the but-for standard for causation is
actually selected to ameliorate the dangers of upsetting the
Court’s preferred vision of the post-race workplace.
CONCLUSION
Using Professor Freeman’s writings as a starting point and
supplementing his analysis with key CRT insights, this Article
has attempted to use selected cases to assess the Court’s approaches to antidiscrimination doctrine over the recent twentyfive years. As indicated in the Introduction, the merits of Professor Freeman’s work are borne out by the fact that his articulation of how the Court’s antidiscrimination jurisprudence undermines racial equality is at least as relevant today as it was
in the late 1970s. While the limits of his project have been noted, the importance of the work has not been diminished by
foundational CRT scholarship that rose in its wake. Rather,
that scholarship has served as a means to further explicate, for
scholars and the Court, how race and racism continue to inform
judicial approaches. A significant point of common agreement
between Professor Freeman’s work and CRT scholarship has
been that the Court’s problematic analyses of race within antidiscrimination cases have been marked by a retreat from racial
salience. The Court’s zealous commitment to moving beyond
race, which has grown since Professor Freeman wrote Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, ensures that a disjuncture between statutory protections and lived experience will continue
310
to grow. In some ways the Court’s full-blown commitment to
post-racialism is understandable. First, it is a natural instinct
to want to pat oneself on the back for the arc of racial progress
311
and use it to declare ourselves no longer racist. Additionally,
Provision in the Wake of University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v.
Nassar, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 475, 494–95 (2015).
310. See generally Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra
note 2.
311. See Barnes, Chemerinsky & Jones, supra note 22, at 975.
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a significant contribution of CRT scholars has been to articulate that race as a category is socially constructed, and of no bi312
ological or genetic import. Hence, on some level, it makes
sense for people to posit that race is not real. And for these
people it also seems logical to reject calls for racial remedies or
respond with incredulity to claims that race continues to matter. This relationship to race mirrors Professor Darren
Hutchinson’s concept of “racial exhaustion,” which he defined
as opposition to racial egalitarian measures premised upon “the
grounds that they are redundant, unnecessary, or too burden313
some or taxing.”
While some may experience frustration related to there being continuous demands for society to invest in equality, that
fatigue pales in comparison to the “everyday indignities” and
“psychic injury” experienced by those who labor under the
314
weight of stereotypes connected to racial classifications.
While race may not be real, the effects of a system of racialization—one that society invests in to create winners and losers
315
along color lines—are real. Under these circumstances, for
312. See, e.g., DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 19, at 7 (“A third theme
of critical race theory, the ‘social construction’ thesis, holds that race and races
are products of social thought and relations. Not objective, inherent, or fixed,
they correspond to no biological or genetic reality . . . .”); see also OBASOGIE,
supra note 33, at 191–92 (detailing the lack of genetic impact of race); Ian F.
Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994) (describing the
social construct of race). For a critique of biological and genetic claims arguing
racial significance, see, for example, DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION:
HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY (2011).
313. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L. REV.
917, 922 (2009).
314. On the more subtle forms of discrimination constituting everyday indignities, see Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation, and the
Promise of Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529, 535–45 (2003). On the
psychic injury that accompanies being a victim of discrimination, see ANNE
ANLIN CHENG, THE MELANCHOLY OF RACE: PSYCHOANALYSIS, ASSIMILATION,
AND HIDDEN GRIEF 14–19 (2001) (describing the concept of racial melancholia,
which identifies grief as both a byproduct of racial discrimination and a source
of racial identity); Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The
Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 127, 129 (1987) (“Society is only beginning to recognize that racism is as
devastating, as costly, and as psychically obliterating as robbery or assault;
indeed they are often the same.”).
315. See GUY P. HARRISON, RACE AND REALITY: WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD
KNOW ABOUT OUR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 34 (2010) (“Races may not exist as
the biological categories many people imagine them to be, but they are still
here with us, nonetheless. Races are real because we made them real.”). Pro-
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the Court to nearly wholesale treat race as some sort of false
consciousness is more than denial and more than disingenuous.
For Professor Freeman, the goal was merely to expose this dishonesty and its untenable consequences for racial justice. The
goal moving forward has to be to push back against the premature embrace of post-race with the same ardor that the Court
displays when it turns its skeptical eye and incredulous tone
toward discrimination claims. With the recent passing of Jus316
tice Antonin Scalia, a stalwart conservative and proponent of
post-racial ideologies, the opportunity to reorient the Supreme
Court’s views on race may now exist.
With moral force and all the tools at our disposable—
empirical, normative, theoretical—race scholars should strike
now to defend the truth of both the past history and the current
lived experience of racism. To quote Professor Angela Harris,
“Claiming a nonwhite racial identity in [an] anti-racist context
is to make a moral demand on whites to recognize and redress
317
the injuries caused by white supremacy.” Currently, claims
for race-based redress are treated as if they are outdated and
themselves the problem. The real problem is the Court’s ahistorical and inaccurate views of the world—views Professor
Freeman saw as perpetuating “the myth of equality of oppor318
tunity.” Such views produce the bizarre circumstance where
instead of attempting to assess when racial difference is tied to
discrimination, they invest in seemingly universal “colorblind
rhetoric,” which is itself “a form of racism that ha[s] facilitated
the re-articulation of [a] once-defeated justification for racial
319
stratification as a statement in support of social justice.”
Hopefully, we will not have to endure twenty-five more years of
out-of-touch and unsound rulings on race before the Court accepts this reality.

fessor Freeman also noted of this reality that “the actual conditions of racial
powerlessness, poverty, and unemployment can be regarded as no more than
conditions—not as racial discrimination.” Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1103.
316. See Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies
at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/
antonin-scalia-death.html?_r=0.
317. Harris, supra note 23, at 212.
318. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 2, at 1119.
319. Zuberi, supra note 285.

